What Next? *A Cuban Exile's View*

THE NEW REPUBLIC

November 10, 1962, 35 cents

Operation Zulu

How the US Seized the Initiative

Arthur I. Waskow

Decisions, D-Day, Dassin

Stanley Kauffmann

China on the March

The Editors

A Few Afterthoughts

Charles Burton Marshall

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Augurs and Omens

★ By and large, a midterm election is a make-believe contest, between make-believe parties over make-believe issues. Since a great nation takes the rites seriously the results can be portentous. To have maximum effect the ceremony requires experts in the fine old art of haruspicy, or mythical divination. Seen from this perspective, nothing links the USA with Ancient Rome so closely as a mid-term election.

The Roman state religion had two classes of diviners, of whom the Colleges of Augurs were the elite. Upon solicitation they could answer questions from predetermined signs, as when the flights of birds from this or that quarter of the heavens indicated the conditions for an undertaking were favorable or unfavorable. They were the George Gallups and the Louis Harris's of their day and – suitably equipped with robes and staffs – they would tell the public at large (or individual clients) what was likely to happen.

The stage of *augury* in the 1962 election is about over: current signs and portents indicate (a) that the Republicans will make prestige gains in recapturing governorships in a number of big states, but (b) they are not apt to come anywhere near equalling the "norm" of recaptured seats in the House. In the last six midterm elections the party out of power has averaged gains of 46 seats, but if the GOP gains more than a dozen seats this year we need a new set of Augurs.

But this is only the beginning of midterm divination – the pre-election phase. The post-election phase comes after Nov. 6. Because of the three make-believe elements ("issues" are mostly local, "parties" are metaphysical concepts, and "contests" are often unrealistic, as when it is a fight between two men equally conservative) election results often require subtle analysis. In a word, nobody knows what the blame things mean. The Romans ran into this problem, too. Maybe we are wrong, but we guess 1962 will be a year when the corollary art of haruspicy will be particularly needed.

America's haruspices are, of course, the political writers, and a fine bunch we are, too! You may be sure that for weeks to come we shall be telling you from the confused election evidence exactly what The National Mood is. Scotty Reston in his white robe, and David Lawrence in his will give their various interpretations based on the arts of haruspex; these comprise interpretation of such things as lightning, natural prodigies and (especially) *extispicium*, the inspection of entrails of sacrificial victims. Well, there have been lots of sacrificial victims in this election but tact forbids our going into *that*.

One thing we like about Kennedy, he doesn't preach much. Maybe he lacks moral fervor as some critics say, but we got an awful lot of that under Eisenhower, who used to trip over it. Take the U-2 affair: Eisenhower stumbled all around with the moral values of the thing and when it came to a showdown somehow or other couldn't bring himself to express apologies to the gloating Khrushchev. By contrast last week, in the midst of the Cuban crisis, Kennedy expressed "regrets" – he used the dreadful little word – when an American reconnaissance plane got over the Soviet Chukotski Peninsula off Alaska.

Cool Kennedy

★The Cuban Affair isn't settled yet and has topped the news for a fortnight. One minor thing that strikes us is the example of Kennedy style. He has been tough but he has been vocally moderate, with a blessed absence of posturing. This is one historic episode that has emerged, so far, without a single patriotic slogan for the school kids. Flamboyancy makes Kennedy uncomfortable. He has avoided clamor and glamor and followed his lonely judgment. He touched bases – he kept de Gaulle, Macmillan and Eisenhower informed (even while the latter was attacking him), and also the Latin American countries. When Senator Russell urged him to invade Cuba at once he quietly declined and at the same time (rightly or wrongly) he turned down the awkwardly-timed Lippmann proposal to swap our bases in Turkey for Khrushchev's in Cuba. He stayed cool in the face of what must have been galling insinuations, as for example the Arthur Krock hint that the crisis represented calculated political timing.

The President remembered to praise Khrushchev for being "statesmanlike" and he accompanied it with a characteristic piece of understatement: "Developments," he wrote, "were approaching a point where events could have been unmanageable." Thinking back, it does seem nice to see the Latin "Alliance" countries unanimously backing us for once and to see a neutral UN team preparing to inspect Soviet missile bases in Cuba. If Cuba, one wistfully wonders, why not the world?

Looking to '63

★ Getting back to more prosaic things there are one or two indications of Administration policies to come. Commerce Secretary Hodges' declaration that he favors a tax cut right away, without waiting for reforms, seems significant. The economy needs a shot in the arm right away and it is doubtful if Congress can work out reforms for months or years.

It looks, too, as though Kennedy would throw at the new Congress all the things that failed in the last – medicare, tax cuts, school aid, etc.

Writing in the excellent *Columbia Journalism Review* Washington correspondent Ben H. Bagdikian offers this trade secret: ". . . Newspapers generally throw their editorial lot on the side of business in any conflict with labor or government or consumer . . . Any modern President who finds himself in conflict with the industrial or financial community can take it for granted that a vast majority of the press will be against him."

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THE NEW REPUBLIC *A Journal of Opinion Volume 147 Number 19 Issue 2503 November 10, 1962*
Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed by The New Republic, *1244 19th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Phone: FEderal 8-2494. Single copy 35c. Yearly subscription, $8.00; Foreign, $9.00, Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00. Advertising rates upon request. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Include old and new address.**Copyright© 1962, by Harrison-Blaine, Inc. Item g. Second class Imprint, reading Second Class Postage Paid at Washington, D. C. Indexed in* Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

THE WEEK

3. China on the March; Fingers on the Safety-Catch; Footnotes to the Week; What Constitutes Proof?; While Meredith Studies; The Right To Be Rude; A Tax Cut – Soon; Cutting Down the Laurels

ARTICLES

9. What Next for Cuba – An Exile's View by Raul Chibas
10. Can Britain's Economy Expand? by Denis Healey
11. Adenauer's Foreign Minister by Terence Prittie
12. Searching for Talent by Richard S. Barrett
14. The Superficial Aspect by Gerald W. Johnson
15. Operation Zulu by Arthur I. Waskow
18. Afterthoughts on the Cuban Blockade by Charles Burton Marshall

DEPARTMENTS

21. Books *24. Feiffer* *25. Movies*
26. Art *28. Records* *29. Ballet*
31. Correspondence

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China on the March

On the day that the strategic Indian frontier post of Towang fell to the Chinese and the specter of Communist troops marching down the Himalayas loomed over South Asia, the president of Pakistan, Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan, was hunting the stately Ibex in the Hunza mountains of Pakistan bordering the USSR and China. While Ayub was pursuing gazelles, the US Ambassador, Walter McConaughy, was anxiously awaiting his return to deliver a message from the White House.

What President Kennedy had to say was of central significance to the success of Indian efforts to resist the Chinese advance. Mr. Kennedy's letter and a similar appeal from Prime Minister Macmillan have not been published but are authoritatively said to ask Pakistan's assurance of a military standstill with India for the duration of the present phase of the border hostilities. With Ayub pledged not to take advantage of India's preoccupation elsewhere for incursions into Kashmir, Indian divisions now deployed on the borders of Pakistan could be redirected to the Himalayan front. The immediate step recommended in the Kennedy-Macmillan appeal was a meeting between President Ayub and Prime Minister Nehru.

Although the anti-Communist credentials of the Pakistan leaders have long been accepted in Washington and London, the Ayub regime has given cause for legitimate doubts with respect to its present intentions by entering into border talks with China on October 13. Nominally, these negotiations in Peking are to be limited to the demarcation of Pakisan's frontier with China's Sinkiang province, but the officials of both countries have alluded to a possible treaty of friendship. As if a China-Pakistan understanding concerning a portion of Kashmir still claimed by India were not enough of a red flag, the prospect of a treaty of friendship comes as an intolerable provocation in New Delhi, which fears collaboration between East Pakistan and Chinese forces encamped to the north in the Thagla Pass area some 165 crowflight miles across a narrow corridor of Indian territory.

Pakistan's position is that with India occupying the bulk of Kashmir – including the Vale and the capital of Srinagar – it is preposterous for New Delhi to find fault with Karachi for treating Pakistani possession of the territory west of the cease-fire line as an accomplished fact. In addition, as Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali pointed out on October 29, Pakistan fears that India will take

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advantage of the intensified Chinese border offensive to obtain military materiel from the US actually intended to build up Indian strength against Pakistan. Arms aid to India that upsets the present "balance" of military power in South Asia would, said Ali, be considered an "unfriendly" act by Pakistan.

The US finds itself in the astonishing position of urging an "ally" to join in the defense of non-Communist territory against unmistakable and unprovoked Communist aggression while a "neutral" expends the lives of forces that have not enjoyed a US subsidy for the past decade. Indian neutralism did not preclude the acceptance of US military help on easy credit, rupee-repayment terms, and US mutual security legislation did not rule out a determination by the President that it is in the US interest to help India resist Chinese expansion.

Conceivably, should hostilities widen and sophisticated armor or tactical nuclear devices become necessary to the Indian defense effort, the Nehru Government will be forced to revise its non-alignment policy and enter into certain commitments attaching to the transfer of top-secret US military information. But for the present, the US has avoided exacting a political price for its military help. The restraint of the State Department in resisting the urge to say I-told-you-so and its care in keeping a step behind stunned Indian leaders during their present foreign policy reappraisal has been one of the more skillful performances of the Kennedy Administration.

Given this restraint in the months ahead, the US may find that it is the beneficiary of a new and intimate relationship with the Indians. Although this implies enormous responsibilities which now can only barely be glimpsed, the worldwide political rewards implicit in a pro-Western reorientation of Indian neutralism obviously outweighs the burdens.

Peking appears to be serving notice that not only Asia but the rest of the non-European world with the possible exception of the Middle East are to be treated as beyond the competence of Soviet leadership in Communist affairs. Moscow has in effect been warned to make way for China as the leader of revolution in Asia, Africa and Latin America. As the only non-white great power now challenging China, India must be cut down to size and forced to acknowledge Chinese primacy, if not, in the last analysis, hegemony. Military humiliation along the traditional Indian Himalayan frontier and the subversion of the buffer states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan offers a starting point. Then, or so Peking might calculate, the diversion of resources from economic development in India to defense will lead to economic and later political collapse.

The growing cordiality of Indo-Soviet relations during the past year exemplified in the projected deal for MIG supersonic aircraft may well have been a determining factor in triggering the Chinese offensive. In any case, Moscow was forced in the showdown to side with Peking, supporting the Chinese on the boundary issue and canceling the MIG agreement. To Indians whose thinking has been based on the geopolitical logic that Moscow needed India as a counterweight to China, the Soviet action has come as a profound shock.

A little-noticed and potentially significant aspect of the Asian scene last week was the reaction of the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa. During the past two weeks there has been Nationalist Commando infiltration along the coast of South China in Kwantung and Fukien provinces. Paratroopers have been practicing in Southern Taiwan in the largest Sino-American airborne maneuver in the past 11 years. This has been called "regular and standard" but there have also been reports of Nationalist paratroop drops near the coast in North China. While US dismantling of the Cuban missile bases occupies Mr. Khrushchev and India engages Mao, might Chiang attempt his return to the mainland? Fanciful as this may seem, the US is on the alert against the possibility of being mousetrapped by Taipeh into war with Red China.

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Fingers on the Safety-Catch

In the last anxious days of October, many Americans learned, in a way that they will find hard to forget, what defense specialists mean when they speak of "unintended war." The possibility of unintended war does not come primarily from the kind of mechanical failure described in melodramas like *Fail-Safe*. It derives from the unmechanical process by which Messrs. Kennedy and Khrushchev evaluate each other's intentions and commitments, trying to calculate how they can pursue their national self-interests without backing their opponent into a corner, real or imagined, from which he can "escape" only by striking first.

The hope that a US-Soviet agreement on removing missiles from Cuba could lead to other steps toward lessening the chances of unintended war was reflected in the notes exchanged between the President and Khrushchev. The two leaders particularly mentioned the need for agreements to control nuclear weapons. For while the Cuban crisis made clear that the major powers will move cautiously in the face of the great destructive power under their control, it also dramatically raised the possibility of nuclear weapons coming under the control of less prudent national leaders. The US military has taken elaborate precautions to prevent Turks, Italians, Germans or anyone else from gaining control over US nuclear weapons in their countries, but nobody felt sure the Soviets, facing the problem for the first time, were being equally dead-sure.

We will probably never know if nuclear weapons, as distinct from missiles and launching sites, were in fact sent to Cuba or if the Russians ever had any intention of sending them – or letting the Cubans ever get their hands on them. Nevertheless the prospect was sufficient to provoke a head-on conflict between the two nuclear super powers. US readiness to risk war appears to have worked in the short run, but it will take more than that if in the long run the spread of nuclear weapons to dozens of potential Castros is to be prevented. Having itself gone to the brink of nuclear war to prevent the spread of such weapons to one small country, the US should be receptive now to curtailing their spread to others. The only measure designed in part to accomplish this which has received serious attention is a nuclear test ban. While it is easy to demonstrate that a ban alone will not halt the spread of these weapons, a ban is a vital first step. Once having agreed themselves to halt testing, the two superpowers would be in a position to exert stronger pressure on their allies and the neutrals to do likewise. The Cuba crisis seems to show once again that the great powers, if they mean business, can force other nations to follow their lead in the interest of peace.

FOOTNOTES *to the* WEEK

GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER *(R, N. Y.) is virtually certain to win reelection, but with his eye on the White House he hopes to better his 573,000 vote plurality of 1958, lest professional politicians decide that his divorce – or some other factor – has tarnished his image. One key to his success may be New York's 700,000 Negro voters, 400,000 of them in New York City. The Rockefeller family has a long history of association with Negro causes, including the Urban League and the United Negro College Fund, and Rockefeller's Civil Rights record is clean. But Negroes, like other minority groups, still tend to vote Democratic.* —— THE NIGERIA-MOROCCO squabble over the UN Security Council seat assigned to "Africa" under the 1946 Gentlemen's Agreement has highlighted the fact that the Security Council no longer represents the actual balance of power, either in the world or in the General Assembly. There is considerable pressure to expand the Council from 11 to perhaps 13 members and allocate the additional seats to Asia and Africa. —— WHEN DEAN ACHESON *called on de Gaulle to brief him on Cuba, the General said he hoped Mr. Acheson was there to inform him of an action to be taken, not to consult him. Mr. Acheson replied in the affirmative and de Gaulle promptly gave his blessing.* —— CUBA is no longer the only Communist stronghold in the Hemisphere. Miguel Arrais, an avowed Communist, has been elected Governor of the large and important northeastern State of Pernambouco, in Brazil. He won by the tiniest margin. Brazilians are speculating whether he will "Cubanize" his State. —— SENATOR LISTER HILL *(D, Ala.) may be beaten by a Republican in November unless the Cuban crisis increases the voter turnout above anticipated levels. His opponent, James Martin, is a former Dixiecrat recently turned Republican, and is running mainly against the Kennedys; he portrays Hill as being hand-in-glove with them and their "socialist" schemes.* —— GOVERNOR ROSS BARNETT cancelled his October 25 Chicago dinner for 200 Midwestern industrialists whom he hoped to interest in investing in Mississippi. The Agricultural and Industrial Board of Mississippi, the most underdeveloped state in the US, is worried about the future. Arkansas economic development between 1957 and 1960 was almost nil as a result of Little Rock; Mississippi could follow the same pattern. ——"PAT" BROWN *has lost ground in his contest with Richard Nixon for the California Governorship but still may pull through. Brown's record has been overshadowed and Nixon has shifted attention to such issues as whether Communists should be allowed to speak in state universities.*

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The New Republic has long urged our government to reconsider its fixation on international inspection. Perhaps having accepted the idea of inspection in Cuba, the Soviets will be more prepared to accept token inspection for nuclear tests in Russia, or perhaps the US will finally recognize that inspection as now contemplated does little if anything to lessen the danger that the US might be caught unawares by a Soviet technical breakthrough.

But a big power test is only the beginning. The superpowers must undertake to bind the rest of the world to a pledge not to share nuclear weapons with anyone else. The US has been reluctant to take the step, preferring to reserve the option of some day giving weapons to a NATO force. This, however, is a game two can play. The Soviets are nervous at the prospect of France or Germany developing a nuclear capability, even if it recognizes these weapons do not appreciably affect the real East-West military balance.

But even a test ban and an agreement not to share nuclear weapons, while valuable, would not strike at the basic problem, which is the over-reliance of great powers on nuclear weapons as instruments of foreign policy. A major objective, which would require changes in US strategy, is therefore mutual assurances by the major powers not to use these weapons first (which the Soviets have frequently suggested). Another useful step would be a cutoff in the production of fissionable materials (which has been proposed by the US). If all or most of this program could be agreed to, the US could then consider pledging itself to confine its nuclear arms to US territory. Unless the President and Premier Khrushchev are now prepared to take some secondary risks in moving rapidly toward the firm control and then the elimination of atomic armaments, the next few years are likely to open the Pandora's box of small powers armed with nuclear devices. Having stared that prospect in the face in Cuba, the great powers should now be ready to act quickly and boldly.

What Constitutes Proof?

The blockade has a limited objective – "withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere" of missile bases and jet bombers. What worried Washington in the hours following U Thant's return from his mission to Havana was how this can be done if Castro won't, or if the Russians cannot or will not compel him to cooperate. An effective blockade cannot go on forever. Moreover, it has no effect on weapons already in Cuba; it can only block a further build-up. Reasonable proof that the missile sites have not only been dismantled but that the missiles have been eliminated may not be obtainable without some on-site inspection – at least of ports and ships. Castro's initial "conditions" for discussing UN inspection – that the US give up its base at Guantanamo, give no help to anti-Castro exiles, and remove the economic pressures on Cuba which were applied before the blockade – were not themselves considered subject to discussion by Washington.

If the UN is kept out, if the US Government's not then satisfied that the President's objective has been reached, if in addition, more reconnaissance planes are shot down by the Cubans (who have already objected to "violations of their air space"), a new situation will have arisen. Castro, finally, will have to go along or go down. But before he does either, he is capable of provoking a great deal more trouble, including louder demands in this country for the President to go beyond blockade.

While Meredith Studies

James H. Meredith was not the first Negro to seek admission to an all-white, state university in Mississippi. Clyde Kennard, a native of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, had tried earlier to enter the University of Southern Mississippi. Meredith made it and today attends classes in Oxford; Kennard is serving a seven-year prison sentence at Parchman Penitentiary, 67 miles to the Southwest.

Kennard had studied at the University of Chicago for three years, but in 1955 he returned home to support his mother and disabled father on their small farm, a 15-minute drive from the University of Southern Mississippi. Kennard hoped to continue his education there. He first applied for admission in 1958, whereupon he was summoned to Jackson, the state capital, for a meeting with the then Governor J. P. Coleman and University president W. D. McCain. Kennard was told that if he withdrew his application he could select any college in America which would accept him, and the State of Mississippi would pay his expenses. He refused. Governor Coleman then asked Kennard to withhold his application until after the elections. He did.

The next fall, 1959, Kennard formally applied for admission. After a brief interview with President McCain, attended by the chief investigator for the state's segregation-enforcing Sovereignty Commission, he was rejected on the ground of "deficiencies and irregularities" in his application. From the interview, Kennard returned to his parked car and was met by two waiting constables and arrested for reckless driving. Questioned at the police station, Kennard was suddenly confronted with five pints of whiskey,

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claimed to have been found in a search of his car. Illegal possession of liquor was added to the charges. A Justice of the Peace found Kennard guilty; he was fined $600 and costs; an appeal was later denied.

After the 1959 application had been rejected, Governor Coleman is reported to have said that, "If Clyde did reapply, there'd be no way of holding him out, because his record was sufficient. There'd be no alternative but to close [the school]." That proved unnecessary.

On September 25, 1960, the Forrest County Cooperative Warehouse was burglarized of five sacks of chicken feed, valued at $5 each. An illiterate 19-year-old Negro, Johnny Lee Roberts, confessed to the theft. As witness for the state, he claimed that the burglary had been instigated and planned by Kennard. He attributed to Kennard knowledge of the warehouse and the watchmen's schedule that Roberts' own testimony later showed Kennard never possessed. Roberts received a five-year probation sentence. But on his testimony Kennard was convicted of being an accessory to burglary and sentenced to seven years.

In a year and a half, James Meredith may receive his degree from the University of Mississippi. Clyde Kennard, however, will never receive a degree from any university in Mississippi, for state law prohibits anyone convicted of a felony from enrolling in a state institution. Kennard's reward will be another five years in Parchman Penitentiary.

The Right To Be Rude

The *Colorado Daily* is not, as are some college newspapers, a creature of the journalism department of the University. It is supported out of general fees paid by each student and is distributed free. Its governing body is a Board of Publications, and its editor, in this case 21-year-old Gary Althen, receives a salary for his work. Or did until he was fired.

There has been a long-running fight at the University of Colorado between a liberal group, which has been in charge of the paper, and more conservative faculty members and students who claimed that they and their views were virtually shut out. In protest, the dissidents started their own weekly. But the tug-of-war would have gone on without national attention had not editor Althen made headlines by publishing, several weeks ago, a long letter by a philosophy major, Carl Mitcham, which called Sen. Barry Goldwater "a murderer, no better than a common criminal." Asked to explain this language after the Senator had angrily protested, Mitcham said that he was using it in a non-dictionary, or Pickwickian sense. President Newton apologized to Mr. Goldwater, but the Senator was not appeased and retorted coldly to the effect that Mr. Newton wasn't fit to hold his job. The President replied that he would not silence dissent (though he had privately advised the editor to desist for awhile from tossing any more grenades). Then a second article by Mitcham appeared in the *Daily*. General Eisenhower was described as "an old futzer," a word of uncertain but derogatory meaning.

This was too much. The President felt he had been let down by those he had defended. He asked the Board of Publications to fire Althen on the ground that the young man was "completely irresponsible." When the Board refused, Mr. Newton persuaded the Regents of the university to approve the naming of three more members to the Board, which gave him a majority. Althen was fired, the *Daily* was put in charge of an enlarged Board of Publications, to which the Dean of the School of Journalism was added. An *ad hoc* students' committee of protest conducted a campus poll which showed support for what Mr. Newton had done by 2,049 to 907. Most of the *Daily's* staff said they would stay on, although the paper removed from its masthead the last three words of its slogan: "71 years of editorial freedom."

"You can't have it both ways," Mr. Newton told students who were massed in the Memorial Center of the University. "You can't insist that you be treated as responsible and mature adults, and then – when something goes wrong – say: 'What's the fuss all about? We're just a bunch of kids'." The campus at last report had returned to normal. Nobody seemed to know quite whose freedoms had been infringed – the editor's or the University's. Nobody clearly raised the question, perhaps academic for a tax supported institution, of whether a university should not be a privileged sanctuary, even for comment that is irresponsible, inaccurate or rude.

A Tax Cut—Soon

The first round in the public debate on new tax legislation opened in the midst of the Cuban crisis. Walter Heller, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, said the need for tax cuts remains pressing. Four days later Secretary of Commerce Hodges suggested that tax reduction and tax reform ought to be clearly separated; that tax cuts are necessary to get the "country going again"; and that reductions in top bracket rates on personal income to 65 percent and in corporate income tax rate from 52 percent to 47 percent would be the best way to get this done.

Clearly there should be a tightening up on deple-

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tion allowances, capital gains, tax for interest income, and a double exemption for the aged blind. The tax structure needs modernizing, but the economy needs tax reduction much more. Tax cuts will not help the income employment statistics in February, March and April, 1963, if a tax reform bill is approved by August, 1963; for even though the cut may be retroactive to January the stimulus to the economy will not be.

The best "tax reform" for 1963 is the simplest, and the simplest is a sizable straight percentage-across-the-board reduction. A 12 percent cut in personal income taxes would cost the Treasury $6 billion; a 12 percent cut in corporate income taxes, from a rate of 52 percent to nearly 45 percent, would cost $3 billion more. And if it became necessary then to cut top bracket rates to 60 percent, less than $100 million additional would be lost, and this could be justified for the political peace and quiet it might bring.

Initially these reductions totaling $9 billion would scare the budget balancers. But the budget will certainly be in deficit in 1963 if the economy continues to stagger and personal incomes and corporate profits fall below expectations. Not all of the additional extra dollars available to business firms and households would find their way to stores and factories, but most of them – perhaps $7 to $8 billion – certainly would so that both personal income and corporate income would rise sharply. Larger incomes mean larger tax revenues; a part, but probably not all, of the tax cut would be recaptured.

The available choices are not complex. The first is whether we want a $575 billion economy with a deficit of $2-3 billion in the federal budget, or whether we want a $625 billion economy with a budget which may be in deficit of $6-8 billion. The second choice is whether the country starts moving to a $625 billion economy early in 1963 with a quick tax reduction in late January or February, or whether the search for greater tax equity and tax neutrality delays the reduction until the fall of 1963 or even 1964.

Cutting Down the Laurels

Three of the six times that the Nobel Prize for Literature has been given to Americans, the choice has been puzzling. The awards to Eugene O'Neill, William Faulkner and Ernest Hemingway were generally welcomed. But in 1930 the prize went to Sinclair Lewis. (Dr. Anders Osterling, who announced this year's award, voted for Theodore Dreiser that year). In 1938 it went to Pearl Buck. Now it has gone to John Steinbeck.

Those who know Steinbeck the man admire him, and few serious readers are ungrateful to Steinbeck for his best work. But few think him as worthy of high recognition, among writers of English, as Edmund Wilson and Robert Frost, or Robert Graves, E. M. Forster, and Evelyn Waugh. Steinbeck's early stories of California, parts of *The Grapes of Wrath*, *Of Mice and Men* (which, in its dramatic version, is one of the best proletarian plays ever written in this country) – all these are the work of a genuine and passionate artist. But for the past 20 years or so, Steinbeck has been cut off from the working-class immediacy and (whatever its fallacies) the Marxism that were his bloodstream. He has fabricated fictions which, in the main, are Cadillac tours of terrain where he had once lived and worked – sentimental books as against those that had been fraternal, warm, stoic. He has filled in his time with super-journalism about marine biology and Russian and American travels, of varying interest and uncommanding quality.

The Swedish Academy specifies that the award was immediately prompted by Steinbeck's most recent novel, *The Winter of Our Discontent*. To say that this book had a mixed reception here is to strain euphemism. A not notably demanding critic, Granville Hicks, wrote of it, "It is difficult to take the novel seriously as a novel; it is impossible [for me] to be impressed by its message." How then could the august Nobel Committee have selected Steinbeck, particularly because of this book?

The answer is perhaps that the Nobel Award Committee is composed of mortal men, not Olympians. (For a hint of the string-pulling possible in their vicinity see Mark Schorer's life of Sinclair Lewis.) If the list of Nobel laureates includes many towering figures – Shaw, Yeats, Mann, Gide, Pirandello, among others – it also includes Rudolf Eucken, Verner von Heidenstam, Carl Spitteler, and Henrik Pontoppidan, whose names will knit most brows. It does not include Ibsen, Proust, Joyce, Hardy. In short, the Nobel list has, proportionately, as many clinkers and omissions as the Pulitzer artistic lists.

There has been considerable speculation about extrinsic influence on the Nobel choices. (For example, one year an anti-Soviet award, Pasternak; next year a Communist-tolerant award, Quasimodo.) None of this is provable but it is all beside the point, because it assumes that there is an ideal system that would unfailingly pick the greatest writer in the world each year and that the Nobel practice falls short of that system. There is, of course, no such writer and no such system. All one can reasonably hope for, in any series of awards, is a good share of agreement with the judges. The provocative point here as noted is that three of the six Nobel awards to Americans have gone to writers who, far from being nationally esteemed among the finest of their time, are not even considered first-rate.

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What Next for Cuba–An Exile's View

Where now is Castro and what is the future of Cuba? There are numerous opportunities to begin the final battle that will end with the overthrow of the regime. But the struggle must be the responsibility of Cubans, led by Cubans. A counter-revolution is bound to fail; only the revolutionary ideals Castro has betrayed will win the support necessary from the Cuban people.

The fact that the US has pledged itself not to invade will deeply affect the different exile organizations. The hope that the US was going to solve the Cuban problem has been one of the chief reasons for the poor showing of Cuban exiles. Everyone has acted under the impression that superior forces would put an end to the dictatorship. Because of that, those who have been fighting Castro inside Cuba have not received the support they need. This negative premise, that others would do the fighting, demoralized even those resisting Castro on the island.

It is a mistake to believe that the revolutionary struggle against a totalitarian system can be conducted by men outside. The exiles can help in various ways, but it is up to those who remain in Cuba to determine the strategy now to be followed.

Events of the past 10 days will perhaps discourage those exiles for whom American help has been considered indispensable. Some may give up. The majority, however, will adapt themselves to the new reality. They will be encouraged by the increased prestige of President Kennedy. Their morale will be uplifted by the retreat forced upon Castro by his Soviet ally.

There are many in Cuba who, though they are convinced of the infamy and failures of the Communist regime, nevertheless have been afraid that American intervention would restore an obnoxious past. If, however, the Cuban problem is left to Cubans to solve and a program can be devised eliminating the evils of the present regime while preserving the positive aspects of the revolution, many of these people will rally to the banner of freedom. I believe there is an immense reservoir of ill-will toward Fidel Castro that can be tapped, *if* an appealing program can be formulated – appealing even to the many Cubans who still believe that Castro was compelled by US policy to accept Communist aid.

Fidel Castro's personal prestige has been badly damaged. He is henceforth a subject of ridicule. A struggle for power behind the scenes is sure to follow. Castro very shrewdly emphasized Soviet support in arms and men in order to create an image of invincibility. Many began to believe in that invincibility, to doubt whether he and his Russian allies could be successfully challenged. Now he is on his own.

Castro has tried to impose on Cuba a regime the people never truly accepted. The Communist Party never was popular. It was most powerful when it supported the first Batista Administration and had two of its leaders in the Cabinet. Throughout all recent Cuban history, the strategy of the Communist Party had always been opportunistic. It never stood firm against those responsible for the exploitation of the nation.

It would be foolish of me to deny Castro's extraordinary popularity during the first year of the Revolution; he represented all the pent-up hopes of people who had struggled for more than 30 years. Castro committed himself to carry out a Revolutionary program. The people believed him. But in spite of this popular following, greater than any enjoyed by any other government in the history of Cuba, Castro was confronted in 1961 with the strongest concerted resistance and sabotage ever known in Cuba. This is an irrefutable fact. The anti-Castro underground was well organized throughout the country. There were more people fighting Castro than had supported him against Batista. The backbone of this anti-Castro movement was made up of representatives of the middle class and of Cuban laborers, as well as many peasants who had been promised land and had not got it. The invasion of Cochinos Bay struck a mortal blow to that underground. The invasion was a tactical mistake, and it permitted Castro to neutralize his most active opponents.

Now, with the weakness of the regime publicly documented and with the realization that the future must be shaped by the Cuban people, individuals who have been working independently against Castro will band together in a revitalized underground. Their efforts will be integrated with that of a growing number of groups outside Cuba who share their hopes.

RAUL CHIBAS

RAUL CHIBAS *was Treasurer of Castro's "26th of July" movement while it was still fighting in the hills. When Castro came to power he was offered the position of Minister of Finance but did not accept it. He did become Chairman of the Board of Directors of the nationalized Cuban railways. He is a former president of the* Ortodoxo *Party. In 1957 he was arrested by the Batista Government. Upon his release he came to the US. In January, 1958, he was named Treasurer of a Castro-appointed Committee of Exiles.*

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THE UK TOO HAS ITS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM

Can Britain's Economy Expand?

London

Whether we join the Common Market or not, Britain's continued influence in world affairs depends on a rapid expansion in our economy. For the last 10 years Britain has lagged far behind the rest of Europe in economic growth: among the industrial powers only the United States has a worse record of stagnation. Though industrial production has risen during this year, it is unlikely to reach a higher level over the whole 12 months than in 1961, while investment is actually lower than last year, presaging an even worse record in 1963. The City journal, *The Statist*, estimates that five percent of Britain's productive capacity is not being used, and that unemployment will have risen to 2.5 percent by December. This is not an encouraging basis, as I am sure the most ardent Europeans would agree, on which to enter the Common Market or to face the other problems of adjustment which will emerge if the enlarged Common Market talks in Brussels fail. And as of this moment I am not as positive about the outcome as was Raymond Aron in the October 27 issue of *The New Republic*, in which he said that the likelihood of Britain's joining is strong.

Businessmen generally are holding back on new investment not only because of the uncertainty surrounding Britain's relations with the Common Market, but also because they fear a recession in the US next year and see the boom in Europe leveling off. Thus one of the curiosities of the Stock Exchange has been the sudden popularity of low interest "gilt-edged" securities guaranteed by the government, at the expense of industrial equities. But there has been a big change in the climate of expert opinion in the last few years. The financial journalists are now all advising the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald Maulding, to be bold and take the risks of expansion rather than stick to the restrictive policies of the last decade. Many observers believe that the drastic reconstruction of the Treasury and the appointment of a new permanent head who is only 47 years old, combined with the pragmatic opportunism of the new Chancellor himself, makes a drastic shift in Britain's economic policy inevitable.

Already the Chancellor has decided to unfreeze part of the banks' special deposits, and further relaxations in the credit squeeze are expected in the next few weeks. But there is a good deal of doubt whether in their present somber mood businessmen will respond to such invitations to increase investment unless further incentives are provided. The classical Conservative recipe, of course, is to increase consumer spending power by tax reliefs. But many newspapers which support the government believe that this time the Chancellor would be wiser to increase government spending, particularly on roads, hospitals, new schools and universities. This probably reflects Maulding's personal preference, but it will not be easy to sell to the rest of his party, which has never fully understood or accepted the concept of public investment.

The real problem, however, is whether the government can manage to promote a sudden expansion in the economy without the increase in imports imposing intolerable strains on the balance of payments. This has been Britain's main bugbear for the last 10 years and the reason for the stop-go policy which has prevented the restoration of business confidence. Unless the government is prepared to resort to some physical controls, the only answer is to increase its liquidity by some international agreement.

Last year, when Selwyn Lloyd went in despair for help to the European Central Banks, they made their assistance conditional on the introduction of restrictive measures in Britain which strengthened sterling only at the price of economic decay. This year Maudling went to Washington in the hope of persuading the International Monetary Fund Conference to adopt more far-reaching measures along the lines preached by Keynes 30 years ago. He was prepared for the rigid conservatism with which the European delegates met his tentative suggestions, but the angry contempt of the Americans came as a shock – particularly since some of Kennedy's advisers have been known to favor some modest variant of the so-called Triffin Plan. British commentators see America's reaction as due to an archaic obsession with the prestige of the dollar, and argue that before long America will find that the bilateral arrangements she is now making to protect the dollar will break down unless buttressed by wider machinery. But there is no doubt that the strain of running the sterling area on inadequate reserves will continue to inhibit the growth of the British economy until wider international liquidity agreements are reached, unless the government is willing and able to introduce measures of financial planning and control which it has always rejected as doctrinaire Socialism.

DENIS HEALEY

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SCHROEDER HAS SURPRISED EVERYONE – INCLUDING, PERHAPS, HIS BOSS

Adenauer's Foreign Minister

Bonn

Just a year ago Gerhard Schroeder, at 51 one of the youngest members of Adenauer's fourth Cabinet but already a veteran Minister with eight years service behind him, was appointed Foreign Minister. Schroeder, it seemed, had no particular qualifications and several disadvantages. He had a "Nazi past." He was thoroughly disliked by the Social Democratic opposition – not necessarily a defect in Adenauer's eyes but public opinion at the time was demanding that the political parties should speak with one voice where Germany's basic national interests were concerned. He had not been outstandingly successful as Minister of the Interior. Finally, Schroeder was popularly supposed to be a pliable protégé of the Chancellor; in all, the general feeling was that if he intended to retain his new post, he would have to assume the accommodating unobstrusive role played by his predecessor and develop a greater tact than he had hitherto displayed.

During the last year Gerhard Schroeder has silenced his critics and confounded the political prophets. It is not too much to say that he has emerged as the outstanding success of this fourth Adenauer administration. He has put himself firmly in the running for the Chancellorship – perhaps not at the end of next year, when Adenauer should retire, but in three years' time when the next Federal election is due. How has Schroeder achieved this near-miracle? More important, will the blossoming of his political talent have a direct effect on West German foreign policy? And will this effect be good or otherwise?



New Berlin Wall

First, a note on Schroeder's past. As a rising young lawyer he was prevailed upon to join the Nazi Party in 1933. The Nazis attached major importance to the enrollment of "good citizens," especially if they belonged to the younger generation. Their party membership was a useful weapon for driving or cajoling the reluctant into their ranks. Schroeder did not become a member of the brown-shirted SA – even though as recently as last autumn West German papers were writing that he did. His name was forwarded for consideration for membership of the SA, but he was rejected as being "not sufficiently interested." Nor did Schroeder take any active part in Nazi politics.

It is questionable whether such nominal membership can be defined as a "Nazi past." Hundreds of thousands of young Germans joined the party in its early years, unaware of its true nature. Schroeder, moreover, became disillusioned much more quickly than most. In 1938 he joined the "confessional church," the branch of the Evangelical churches which openly resisted Nazi encroachments. A little later he gave employment in his law office to the daughter of Pastor Niemoeller, who was sitting in a Gestapo jail. In 1941 Schroeder married a wife with Jewish ancestry, who was liable to persecution under the infamous Nuremberg racial decrees. In 1941, too, he left the Nazi Party – a bold step to take in wartime. In view of his actions after 1938 it is not surprising that Schroeder was quickly de-Nazified after the war and recovered his full rights and privileges as a citizen.

For a time after the war Schroeder was employed in the Ruhr steel industry and made his home in Dusseldorf. He became a member of the Christian Democratic Party, entered the Bundestag and acted for a while as Brentano's deputy-chairman in the Parliamentary Party. His energy and application, rather than any obvious political flair, brought him the post of Min-

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ister of the Interior in 1953 and for eight long years he remained the Minister "best-hated" by the Social Democratic opposition and the smaller parties. A singularly persistent ill-luck pursued him. He was blamed for the flight to East Berlin of the secret-service chief, Otto John. His suggestion that John's organization should be converted into a "State Security Service" excited mock-horror – for the phrase recalled the repressive machinery both of the Nazis and of the East German Communist regime. Schroeder drew up an "Emergency Law," which failed to pass the Bundestag and which reawakened fears that he was authoritarian-minded. He became heavily involved in Adenauer's ill-fated effort to create a government-sponsored television network.

Schroeder's enemies maintained that he was ruthlessly ambitious and, with a certain lack of consistency, Adenauer's factotum and even his tool in home affairs. The Opposition christened him the "Constitution-breaking Minister." There was a time when Schroeder only had to rise to his feet in the Bundestag for howls of fury to come from the Social Democratic benches – while his own Christian Democratic colleagues remained silent.

Yet a few months after he became Foreign Minister, Schroeder had become the favorite of both the Free Democrats (Adenauer's awkward allies) and the Social Democrats (Schroeder's uncompromising opponents). He had charmed the foreign members of the diplomatic corps in Bonn in a way that his predecessor, von Brentano, had not. He made a deep impression in the foreign capitals he visited, and was, in short, a brilliant success.

Schroeder has revealed characteristics hitherto unsuspected. With representatives of foreign governments he has been the soul of tact. In contrast to the dogmatic Brentano, he has used a pragmatic, commonsense approach to his problems and shown a refreshing disposition to listen to the opinions of others (he used to have the reputation of being most unwilling to do this). He has entirely shaken off the slur of Adenauer's tutelage, and has developed a freshness and independence of outlook which the aging Chancellor must have found disconcerting. With twice the ability of Brentano, and ten times the character, he has become lucid too, relying on the telling phrase more and on stale catechism less. He has developed a rounded, instead of angular personality.

More important, he has emerged as the exponent of the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance as opposed to the Adenauer-Brentano concept of a Franco-German entente as the kernel of a European "third force." Adenauer has been moving, ever since his 1958 meeting in Bad Kreuznach with de Gaulle, toward the policy of a self-contained, "small" Europe, armed with its own nuclear weapons, preoccupied with its own interests, seeking a settlement of its own problems by asserting its own strength. Schroeder believes in the need to tie America to Europe, to merge Britain and its Commonwealth with it, and to employ flexible diplomacy as a major weapon against aggressive Communist policy. Schroeder spent part of his time as a student at Edinburgh University; this not only helped him to understand the Anglo-Saxon mentality, it made him think more like an American or an Englishman – continuously evaluating, equating, adapting; never surrendering to the lure of the fixed plan or the absolute ideology.

Schroeder has difficult days ahead of him. Adenauer's heart is now set on the final realization of Franco-German union, though he can be sure of remaining only another year in the Palais Schaumburg. Old men in office are hardly undisguised blessings; old men in a hurry are certainly not. It is lucky for the West that as a long era of patriarchal rule draws to a close in the Federal Republic, it has a Foreign Minister who is clear-headed, courageous and sensible.

TERENCE PRITTIE

Searching for Talent

by Richard S. Barrett

The aggressive personality test salesman with pat answers to hard questions has made a great financial success by offering his wares to business. He has also inspired the wrath of, among others, Martin L. Gross, whose "The Search for the Square" appeared in the October 1, 1962, issue of *The New Republic*. But lest the reader be left with the impression that Mr. Gross has accurately tapped the pulse of the profession of industrial psychology, or provided a useful prescription for improvement, let a former selector of managers discuss some of the points which he made, as well as some he distorted, omitted or gently slid over.

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Mr. Gross's major theme is that all personality testing is no good and should be abandoned. But what are we to do? Are we to conclude that we know all there is to know about selecting people? Are we to return to the era of General Bullmoose who could tell a good man "by the cut of his jib"? The obstinate fact is that executives do make mistakes in selecting people. A survey reported in 1957 by two psychologists, Gaudet and Carli, showed that, in the opinion of 117 major executives of large corporations, 80.9 percent of the failures of executives under their direction were caused by personality deficiencies, such as inability to delegate, to analyze data, to make decisions, to judge people and to cooperate with others. Only 7.7 percent attributed failures to lack of knowledge of technical processes, materials, accounting, etc. It seems apparent that the executives who selected these failures did a better job of judging their technical competence than their personalities; and that some help in evaluating personality is called for.

Nevertheless, Mr. Gross is right in decrying the application to executives of personality tests which were developed for different purposes, and which have not been shown to distinguish between those who can make the grade and those who cannot. Industrial psychologists have made repeated statements based on research evidence that such tests generally do not work. But too many managers blithely ignore their admonitions and their evidence and harken to the test peddler who offers, for a few cents, the key to any applicant's personality.

Let me give an example. Mr. Gross devotes a column and a half to attacking one of the most popular tests, Walter V. Clarke's Activity Vector Analysis, an adjective check list which is analyzed by personnel men trained by Clarke's organization. Perhaps Mr. Gross's undocumented lambasting will turn the interested executive to the professional literature, or at least lead him to pay more attention to his own psychologists. I sat one day in the office of a well-known industrial psychologist employed by one of the largest companies while he discussed the AVA on the telephone with a line executive. He pointed out that there were many published studies which showed that it could not predict success; he described a study conducted within the company which had the same results; and he pointed out that the articles favorable to the AVA were written by people who worked for the Clarke organization. When he hung up he said to me, "But they will go right on using it."

RICHARD S. BARRETT *is Associate Professor of Psychology and Management Engineering at New York University.*

In his polemic against job fitness tests that don't work, Mr. Gross fails to mention that tests can and do work when used by psychologists who have been given the chance to do their job properly. Psychologists at one company recently checked the long-range predictions made by a test battery which they developed in 1949. The test battery predicted long-range success well.

The predictions in this particular instance were more accurate than those made at the same time by the supervisors of these executives. A test which outperforms supervisors, who have had a long time to get to know their subordinates, can certainly out-perform personnel men who have only one short interview on which to base their evaluation of new applicants.

Mr. Gross also attacks what he calls "empirical personality testing." In this technique the professional psychologist, with more humility than the amateur, concedes that there is much that he does not know about what distinguishes the good performer from the poor. So, he divides a sample of executives into the more and less able. Then he tries to find out how they differ. Once he has established these differences he is in a position to build a theory of performance based not on what his intuition tells him, nor on what he would like to believe, but on what the evidence says. If a distinguishing characteristic seems like nonsense, it is not the evidence that is at fault but the person who is trying to interpret it.

Nowhere in his article does Mr. Gross offer a prescription for improving the fateful process of selecting a man for a job, so I will offer one of my own. I propose, and I presume that Mr. Gross might be persuaded to go along at least part way with me, that we do less probing of the applicant's psyche and look more thoroughly into how he works, and how his unique style of performance will fit the position for which he is being considered. I propose that we study what the person does on the job, or has done, or believes he should do, in order to discharge his duties satisfactorily, and use this information to place him on a job where he will work best. There is considerable evidence that no matter how well psychologists understand an individual's personality, they have difficulty translating what they know into a description of how he will perform. Studying his performance more directly would narrow the gap between what is observed and what is predicted.

Improving the techniques by which we select and place people in jobs is not an easy task and it costs money. But America is the world's richest nation. We can afford to sink $35 million into a hole in the earth's mantle – just to see what's inside. Yet we invest far less than that amount in learning how to select our future leaders.

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The Bear and the Dragon

It is not conducive to logical analysis and lucid utterance for a writer to be keenly aware that by the time what is written comes under the reader's eye the vaporized writer may be floating around in the stratosphere, mingling with the impalpable dust of what had been his city. Yet in the last days of October this realization must have been in the back of the mind of everyone who presumed to comment on public affairs. Events were moving at a speed capable of turning the sensible remark of one day into "wild and wandering cries" 24 hours later.

But when, as, and if the excitement dies down a little it is possible that we may discover that we had been giving almost all our attention to the secondary, rather than the primary crisis. While Castro was making threatening gestures toward the US, the Chinese were actually spilling into India.

The oddest factor in the whole situation is that the invasion of India may have a more sinister significance to Khrushchev than to Kennedy. Many Western observers thought they detected a note of hysteria in the initial response of the Indian Government; and if that impression was shared by the Kremlin, then this was not an auspicious moment for Russia to become involved in a risky adventure in the Western Atlantic.

For with Mao in control of India, Russia would instantly be relegated to the status of a second-class Communist power. She might be reduced again to the extremity of seeking alliance with her erstwhile enemies, as she had to seek it in 1939; in which event the speed which which she would throw not only the missile bases but Castro to the sharks would be equalled only by her enthusiasm.

The time factor, of course, appears to discredit this appealing theory. It is hardly imaginable that the realistic Chinese would attempt to move large armies over the Himalayas during the months in which the passes are choked with snow. But it is easily credible that the current operations are merely preliminary to the real attack, scheduled for next summer. By driving on the Indian outposts and securing the border states now, China will be free to use the cold weather, during which transport is easiest over the highlands of Sinkiang and Tibet, to mass supplies north of the mountains, ready for a descent in overwhelming force when the passes are free of snow next year.

Whether this possibility is more appalling to us than to the Russians is open to debate. Certainly it would leave us in a well-nigh hopeless position in Southeast Asia, but the Russian position east of the Caspian would be hardly more comfortable, and even the Volga valley might be haunted by ancient nightmares of Batu and the Golden Horde.

It is true that the whole position would be changed overnight if the uneasiness regarding the Indian Army were relieved. The fact that the first troops were sent into that cold country without winter clothing and with insufficient supplies of ammunition may have been a mere fluke. Our own military machine has perpetrated equivalent stupidities, yet has recovered by merely busting a general or two. But if the initial inefficiency is symptomatic of a widespread condition, both we and the Russians are facing something that makes both Castro and Berlin sink to the rank of petty annoyances.

To the well-meaning but perplexed American there is small comfort in any of this. It would profit us little to have the Bear desist from growling, if it were only to give place to the Dragon spitting fire. Perhaps our most serious danger is that of relaxing too quickly and comfortably in case the President wins a clear-cut diplomatic victory over the Dictator. It may not be a victory. It may be that "just then flew down a monstrous crow, as big as a tar-barrel," which we were told as children, once put a summary end to a historic confrontation. In that case, our apparent triumph in Cuba would only signify the end of the beginning.

Certainly being a citizen of one of the super-powers is no bed of roses, however gratifying it may be to national pride. The long labor of consolidating peace will not end this week, or next, and there are probably many setbacks and frustrations still ahead; but the only final, irretrievable defeat would be to withdraw into a fancied isolation, that is, to quit.

There has been a show running in New York with the title, *Stop the World! I Want to Get Off*. It is, of course, facetious; but there is an element in this country, not strong but appreciable, that seems to have adopted that sentiment as its philosophy. That element is far more dangerous than Castro ever was.

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Operation Zulu

by Arthur I. Waskow

The following documents are part of an historical case study of decision-making in the initiation of covert action in foreign policy. I have undertaken a full analysis of Operation Zulu (to be published by Praeger in 1977), but I am glad here to offer fellow scholars and the public some early fruits of my research. It can be disclosed that these documents were retrieved by US intelligence in late 1962 before they reached the Soviet Government. Soviet Operative K-19, into whose hands they had fallen, was eliminated at once. The retrieval prevented Operation Zulu from being totally compromised, and permitted it to proceed to a successful conclusion in July, 1970. Operation Zulu itself is by now well-known, but only the recent declassification of official papers has opened its origin to scholarly scrutiny. The documents have been edited, with the assistance of the staff of the National Archives, to remove repetitive comments. – AIW.

DOCUMENT 1

Covering memorandum from Operative K-19 to the Committee of State Security, USSR, Dec. 23, 1962:

The documents reproduced below appear to represent as dangerous a threat to the forces of socialism as my report (XO-4397-B) in 1947 on Riesman plans for "The Nylon War." Please note the present program is far more advanced, having been accepted by the ruling circles of the United States. My information is that Stage 1 of Operation Zulu will be put into effect on January 1, 1963. My informant is a high official of the Department of State, a Southern *rentier* who says he will use any means available to prevent the success of Zulu. I recommend keeping in close touch with him as our own strategy develops.

DOCUMENT 2

From: *Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs*
To: *Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of State*
Classification: TOP SECRET

The success of our recent operation in Cuba suggests that this government would now be administratively capable of taking the initiative elsewhere *vis-à-vis* the Bloc, and that such initiatives would be both militarily and politically useful in exploiting the new situation which has arisen. Please advise whether present contingency planning can suggest suitable specific opportunities along these lines.

DOCUMENT 3

From: *Policy Planning Council, Department of State*
To: *Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs*
Copies to: *Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Chief of Staff, Army*
Classification: TOP SECRET

A major opportunity for seizing the initiative is latent in current preparation of a sizable counter-insurgency capability in the Special Forces of the United States Army. Such a capability has heretofore been regarded as useful only in a reactive sense, as a means of resisting Bloc support for so-called "wars of national liberation" (*e.g.*, Vietnam), in states friendly to the United States. But it is possible to consider this growing capability as a preemptive tool to advance the national security of the United States by initiating action to organize or channel popular disaffection in Bloc countries into effective resistance.

DOCUMENT 4

From: *The President*
To: *The Attorney-General*
Classification: TOP SECRET *(Handwritten)*

Take a look at this memo. It seems to say we should use our training techniques in counter-guerrilla meth-

ARTHUR I. WASKOW *is the author of* The Limits of Defense, *and co-author of the forthcoming* America in Hiding, *a history of the 1961 "shelter mania."*

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ods, and also the trained cadres, for guerrilla action against Communist governments. How does that hit you? – Jack

DOCUMENT 5

From: *The Attorney-General*
To: *The President*
Classification: TOP SECRET *(Handwritten)*

Let's get George, Bob, Mac, Walt and Max over to talk about it. – RFK.

DOCUMENT 6

Memorandum of Conversation: *The President, the Under-Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney-General, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State.*
Classification: TOP SECRET

The question was raised of possible use of US Special Forces as a cadre for instigating guerrilla action against certain Communist governments. It was objected

1. that there is too little known of probable Soviet reactions to such action, Hungary being instanced as a possible and disastrous model of the Soviet response;

2. that the case of the Cuban invasion of 1961 indicates that the United States has too little experience in carrying through guerrilla revolutions, and that the Vietnam experience is inconclusive to date.

It was further suggested that a less risky alternative would be to "experiment" in overthrowing an oppressive government which the Soviets would not or could not protect against popular revolt. It was also argued that such an "experiment" would give needed additional familiarity with guerrilla-type operations by Special Forces.

After considerable examination of various possibilities, it was proposed that the United States help overthrow the government of the Republic of South Africa. It was argued that South Africa is nearly friendless in the world, that no negative interposition by the United Nations is probable, that the Soviet Union would not unleash general war on South Africa's behalf or attempt to protect her government directly, that American opinion is largely antagonistic to South Africa, that the possibility of using Negroes as cadres would assure a sufficient supply of suitable recruits, and that aid to overthrow the South African Government would improve the United States image in Africa, Asia and Latin America. This proposal met with general interest, although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the importance to the US of fueling privileges in Capetown.

The President requested that the Attorney-General and the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, jointly explore this possibility and report to the Committee of Principals of the National Security Council.

DOCUMENT 7

Preliminary Report From: *Policy Planning Council, Department of State.*
To: *Committee of Principals, National Security Council*
Endorsed by: *The Attorney General*
Classification: TOP SECRET

We propose that the United States, in a three-stage operation beginning January 1, 1963, commit itself to the overthrow of the present government of the Republic of South Africa and its replacement by a popularly elected, non-Communist government. We propose that to fulfill this commitment the United States make available to the people of South Africa a guerrilla force made up of highly-trained American Negroes, under the command of the Special Forces, United States Army. We further propose that this operation be known as Operation Zulu, and that a target date of July 4, 1970, be established for its conclusion.

Proposed details of Stage I of Operation Zulu are outlined below. Planning of Stages II and III is proceeding and will follow shortly.

Stage I – January 1, 1963, to December 31, 1963

Secret enlistment would be undertaken of a volunteer group of American Negro males, both civilians and members of the Armed Forces, between the ages of 18 and 35. They would be trained in techniques of infiltration, propaganda, violent and non-violent revolutionary resistance to established government, reconstruction of the social, economic and political order in territory liberated, and other means of effective guerrilla action. They would also be instructed in African languages and customs.

This force would be trained in the State of Mississippi (secretly until July 4, 1963; openly afterward). Cadres would be made up of existing Army Special Forces units now trained in counter-insurgency, and of racial activists with experience in American sit-ins, freedom rides, race riots, bus boycotts. Membership lists of the Congress of Racial Equality, the Black Muslim sect, the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee and the Southern Christian Leadership Council should provide a useful initial source for recruiting appropriate personnel.

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DOCUMENT 8

From: *Central Intelligence Agency*
To: *Committee of Principals, National Security Council*
Classification: TOP SECRET

This Agency (1) requests permission to present evidence indicating the effectuation of the proposed Operation Zulu lies within the purview of its competence (2) requests permission to nominate one member of an Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Committee on plan development for said Operation.

DOCUMENT 9

Draft Memorandum for Circulation and Approval
From: *Committee of Principals, National Security Council*
To: *The President*
Classification: TOP SECRET

It is proposed that an Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Committee to plan and administer Operation Zulu be appointed, to consist of: Chester Bowles, Special Assistant to the President for Asian, African and Latin American Affairs, Chairman; Chief of Staff, Army; Assistant Attorney-General for Civil Rights.

DOCUMENT 10

From: *Secretary of Defense*
To: *The President (Handwritten)*

There seem to be some objections over here to Bowles as head of the Zulu project. In the interest of harmony what about Director of Intelligence from State?

DOCUMENT 11

To: *Secretary of Defense*
From: *The President*
Classification: TOP SECRET *(Handwritten)*

Hilsman has his hands full with Vietnam. Anyway, if this gets away from the White House staff, CIA, State and you people will all want it and we'll never get started. Bowles seems to me to give the program the right tone, especially overseas. I'll add Hilsman to the committee along with Klein from CIA.

DOCUMENT 12

From: *Special Assistant to the President for Asian, African and Latin American Affairs*
To: *Chief of Staff, Army; Assistant Attorney-General for Civil Rights; Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Deputy Director, CIA*
Classification: TOP SECRET

The enclosed memorandum from the acting Director of Research, Project Zulu, is submitted for comment by the Inter-Agency Committee and staff.
Enclosure:
To: *Special Assistant to the President for African, Asian and Latin American Affairs*
From: *Acting Director of Research, Project Zulu*

The exclusion of Negroes from "in-group" citizenship in American society, and especially the handicaps which bar Negro youth from masculine maturation into responsible participant roles, have produced deep and widespread feelings of alienation. Operation Zulu affords a grass-roots opportunity to offer young male American Negroes psycho-social solidarity with the Nation, the Society as such. Operation Zulu could work to ameliorate Negro self-hate, to provide a new role through which the Negro could resolve his identity problems, and to restore the essential relatedness of American Negro to American white, if the Operation builds upon the Negro Experience. Zulu could teach American society to value its African heritage as much as its European one.

Nevertheless, recent developmental trends in South Africa indicate that it shares many of the salient characteristics of such post take-off societies as our own South, and that there may be reason to question the relative effectiveness of violent resistance in mobilizing the already somewhat bourgeois aspirations of the South African Negro. If possible, it would be desirable to have a variety of controlled experiments during Stage I of Zulu before guerrillas initiate destabilization activities in South Africa itself. Would such experiments be feasible at our present training center in Mississippi? If experimental efforts at overthrowing the Barnett regime were to prove the superiority of non-violent efforts, much investment of money and prestige might be avoided at a later date, with no deleterious effect on US posture.

DOCUMENT 13

From: *Special Assistant to the President for Asian, African and Latin American Affairs*
To: *The President*

In accordance with your instructions via telephone, my "lyrical" staff assistant has been transferred to the Office of Education.

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DOCUMENT 14

Supplementary Report From: *Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Committee on Operation Zulu*
To: *Committee of Principals, NSC*

The following additional plans are proposed for Stages II and III of Operation Zulu:

Stage II – July 4, 1963, to July 4, 1965.

On July 4, 1963, the President of the United States should address a joint session of Congress, announcing the intention of the United States to bring about an end to oppressive government in South Africa and asking for a "pre-dated" declaration of war (in the style of the Formosa, Middle East and Cuba Resolutions approved by Congress) to be put into operation by the President as conditions warrant. The President would simultaneously announce withdrawal of recognition from the present South African Government, and suspension of trade.

The President would specifically refer to Soviet anti-colonial propaganda and compare this with the vigorous American action. He would challenge the Soviet Union to an "anti-colonial race."

The President would set July 4, 1970, as a target date for establishment of a democratic South African Government.

During the two years from July, 1963, to July, 1965, the United States would combine continuous diplomatic, political, propaganda and economic pressures against the South African Government with the smuggling of American Negro guerrillas into the country. The initial effort should be made to liberate and secure one of the reservation areas as a base for infiltration into the rest of South Africa.

Stage III – July 4, 1965, to July 4, 1970.

On July 4, 1965 the United States should recognize a government of "Free South Africa," based on the liberated area and run by "safe" (*i.e.*, non-Communist) indigenous leaders who command the confidence of large numbers of Africans. After that, the revolution should be pressed with as little outside direction and as much African control as possible, so long as progress appears satisfactory.

DOCUMENT 15

From: *The Attorney-General*
To: *The President* (EYES ONLY)

I thought I'd add a note for you alone. It might seem at first glance that Zulu would ruin us on the Hill, but I think we can turn this Operation to advantage.

I suggest selected Southerners be acquainted with Zulu enough ahead of time to show them that every civil rights group in the country will be tied up first in training and then in supporting the guerrillas.

Attention would be redirected from Alabama, etc., to the revolution in South Africa. If Southerners understand in advance, they should welcome Zulu. Also, a lot of other people on the Hill would be just as glad to let civil rights simmer on a back burner for a few years. – RFK.

[At this point the documents collected by Operative K-19 come to an end. As a matter of conjecture it might be assumed that K-19's apprehension was linked with the disappearance of the late Harrison Willis, former Secretary to the Policy Planning Council of the State Department. This hypothesis will be fully discussed in my forthcoming monograph. –AIW]

Afterthoughts on the Cuban Blockade

by Charles Burton Marshall

That crucial October fortnight, with the issue of Soviet missiles in Cuba arising and having to be met, provided simple but profound lessons about the nature of policy and decision. Four aspects, widely misunderstood and misinterpreted, seem to deserve particular attention: namely, the justification and necessity of the President's not confronting Soviet Foreign Minister Andre Gromyko with "preliminary hard information" concerning emplacement of missiles when the two conferred on October 18, this Government's omission of consultation with its allies before announcing a blockade and bringing to bear threats of further measures on October 22, the status of the actions under international law, and finally the question of how our side came out on balance.

To begin, one has to be clear as to the nature of

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negotiating relationships between governments involved in a basic conflict of interests and purposes, as the United States and the Soviet Union are. The relevant points are so elementary as to seem banal.

Such relationships differ fundamentally from those between governments with compatible outlooks and aims. Diplomatic interchange between the US and the USSR is only a way of registering the wills and capabilities brought to bear by the opposing sides. It is a mode of conducting the power contest – not an alternative to it. This reciprocal process is exacting and risky. It calls for hardy wills and fine discernments. It is susceptible of getting out of hand and eventuating in war when one party over-commits itself to a proposition which underestimates the adversary's will to prevail or resist.

Any agreement on terms of peace negotiated by adversary powers must be conditioned on their fear of the consequences of not agreeing.

In this perspective, President Kennedy's favored and oft-repeated apothegm about never negotiating in fear and never fearing to negotiate is quite misleading, even contradictory. Adversary powers have to negotiate in fear of what may happen in the sequel to a failure to settle on terms. A power must rationally fear having to negotiate under unfavorably disproportionate compulsion.

Whatever its precise effect on relevant military factors, the Soviet Union's deployment of missiles to Cuba constituted a clear attempt to redress factors of compulsion in its own favor so as to render the United States amenable to terms more to the Soviet Union's advantage. The President's response was an initiative designed to be countervailing.

Whether there was some misunderstanding regarding meanings and facts, especially with respect to content of the elusive word "defensive" applied to the Soviet armament of Cuba, is a niggling point. One can only wonder at the import attributed to the point in supposedly serious criticisms of the President's conduct of the meeting with Gromyko.

On a basis of cold words contained in snippets from the key conversation, no outsider can competently judge the state of understanding between the President and the Soviet regime. It was a matter for intuitive judgment – not a matter susceptible of being tested under the rigors of judicial evidence. As Commander-in-Chief, as primary agent of our foreign policy, and as the specific executor of the Congressional resolution of intent regarding Cuba, only the President was in constitutional position to make the judgment. Only he, as our chief participant in the interchanges, was able to take into account all relevant nuances.

For the President to have taken further pains to notify and to warn the adversary regarding our knowledge of what the adversary must have known we knew could have gained nothing. To have made the prospect and thrust of our counter initiatives a topic of diplomatic interchange would in high probability have lost much. It would have deprived the contemplated actions of whatever cogency they might have, dulled the impressions of resolution we wanted to convey, and afforded the adversary opportunity to forestall or to nullify our initiatives with some more of his own.

A Game of One-Upmanship

In a match of one-upmanship, the adversary saw himself as one-up. This had to be redressed. Should our man in the White House have given warning and disclosure of our next move – have told the opposing fellows that in fairness we owed them advance word of plans to get one-up on them in turn? Absurd is the word for the idea.

Mere words would not serve. Too much of a past had to be overcome. We had bespoken determination over Laos, only to settle for the troika there. We had flinched on following through at the Bay of Pigs. The pattern of the call-up of reserves in mid-1961 had prefigured an addition of five or six divisions to our Army. After words of rage privately conveyed from Khrushchev, the plan had petered out. We had huffed and dawdled as a wall rose in Berlin.

Admittedly, the problem of discoursing both to give pause to adversaries and to humor the timorous and uncommitted is not easy, but we had long overdone the latter aspect with maxims about no alternative to negotiation and about willingness ever to traverse another last mile in parleying – this last an invitation to adversaries to go on setting up mileposts along an interminable course.

Only a few days earlier the President himself had ferociously assailed an Indiana Senator for proposing, with respect to Cuba, a course involving exposure of other people's sons to risk. A prerogative to expose other people's sons to risk underlies state authority as distinguished from that of a tribe, whose powers are circumscribed by kinship. State authority endangers other people's sons when it quenches a fire, quells a riot, or defends a homeland. With respect to Cuba, the President had gone so far as implicity to derogate from his power to perform constitutional duties.

With so much in the record to be offset, immediate and unequivocal action was called for to reestablish credit. This was not abandonment of diplomacy. It was a step necessary for reconstituting an acceptable basis for it. To have gone off consulting far and wide on next steps with three dozen allies would have

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vitiated the whole idea. What was to be done had to be done without regard to contingencies of support or assent from other quarters. United States determination to act thus alone in sovereign discretion had to be manifested to friends as well as opponents as a fact requiring to be taken into account in their relations with us. Advance consultation could only have obscured the fact.

A further circumstance militated against consultation. The great ranges of lands and peoples in the world are the Northern and the Western Hemispheres. Cuba interacted within and between them both. The United States, besides being custodian of a nuclear shield integral to the security of either hemisphere, is the only great power located in both hemispheres. It is the sole nation involved in both relevant security structures – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization of American States. Its Government alone among the American allies had appreciation of the interaction between Cuba and, say, the Berlin situation. Among the Atlantic allies it alone was intimately knowledgeable of Cuba's implications through the Americas. To have gone off now on exploratory talks could scarcely have added anything to what was required for us to resolve our will.

The cavil about consultation misses an essential of alliances. I can perhaps make my point clear by an analogy to something I observed when in the Army. When a man was not up to the mark, the practice was to assign him a helper also not up to the mark. I learned to call this faulty premise the half-wit fallacy because it involved a notion of combining half-wits to form whole wits. Actually the relationship was not additive but multiplicative, producing quarter-wit results. Deficiency does not compound into sufficiency. The lesson applies to factors of heart as well as mind. Half-heartedness does not combine into courage. An alliance can be strong only as its leading elements have and show moral capacity to act alone in exigency. In potential, if not in accomplished fact, our alliances are stronger now because the United States seized a sole initiative.

Is the Charter Obsolete?

The legality of our actions can best be left to international law classrooms. Blockade is a belligerent prerogative. If parties affected choose not to acknowledge its belligerent character, it gets by as a peaceable act. Our resort to such action and hints of worse to come were probably not countenanced by the letter of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, for no attack to justify invocation of force in our own behalf had as yet occurred. By a purist's argument, we should have cleared our plans with the veto-bound Security Council before acting at all. The point lies with equal relevance to our *post-facto* clearance with the Council of the OAS, whose warrant to authorize forcible remedial actions is subordinated to Security Council approval under Article 53 of the UN Charter. Capacity to bring about drastic shifts in force factors by sudden, stealthy, massive weapon deployments in a nuclear age simply renders obsolete the precondition of attack to the licensing of self-defense under Article 51. Facts have outgrown a concept.

It is beyond law to provide a signal for transgression against one's vital interests. A Government must make up its own mind on that. Goethe provides a proper answer on the legalities: "In the long run, over-great goodness, mildness, and moral delicacy will not do, while underneath there is a mixed and sometimes vicious world to manage and hold in respect."

Yet, finally, to what avail? The results could have been worse. They provide that small measure of comfort. The Government at least desisted from retracting missiles from Turkey to balance withdrawal of missiles from Cuba – a course urged by commentators and bishops out of what seemed an esthetic hankering for symmetry. Perhaps, indeed, the outcome was the best achievable in view of the lag in drawing an issue. No one will ever know for sure.

The paens occasioned by Soviet agreement to dismantle baffle me. Only by focusing narrowly on the issue of missile deployment can one call this a retraction on the part of the Soviet Union. Our President's avowal, on April 20 last year, of resolve never to abandon Cuba to Communism has been publicly put aside – no mean feat of word-swallowing. By contrast, the Soviet pledge to shelter the Cuban regime is now redeemed. Cuba is now unmistakably a Soviet protectorate. We have negotiated on this basis with the Soviet Union. Communist power is ensconced in this hemisphere. We have in effect legitimized this. We have joined in invoking UN blessings on the arrangement.

One must await what events may disclose as to the power of precedent in the pattern – what other positions may go in a sequence of seeing a Communist regime put into power by whatever means, having the stakes raised, then guaranteeing the position in return for having the stakes lowered. As a gain, Cuba is somewhat akin to that victory at Ausculum: a few more such could be our undoing.

A disposition to view the developments as giving promise for negotiating a general detente seems borrowed from fantasy. It reminds me of an occasion when the Duke of Wellington was approached by a man saying, "Mr. Peabody, I believe!" The Duke replied: "If you believe that, you can believe anything."

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Conserving the Farm Problem

by Asher Brynes

"There are a million farmers in the USA who, while they may do a lot of work with their hands, nevertheless are a very high order of businessmen," said Henry A. Wallace last summer at the Centennial Observance of the Department of Agriculture which both his father and he had served as Secretaries. "These exceptionally capable men and their families represent only 3 percent of our population, but they furnish nearly all our food. They are individuals and they have never been institutionalized by any farm group. They learn from the farm papers, the salesmen of farm products, the Agricultural Experiment Stations of the Department of Agriculture. It is because of these men that we are so far ahead of the Communist world in food production."

The Care of the Earth
by Russell Lord
(Nelson; $7.50)

But what of the greater number of farmers who are not businesslike? What about those who grow small quantities of food and fiber on a part-time or part-retirement basis, and work seasonally or even through the year in nearby factories, or depend on Social Security payments to make up the difference between what they earn as farmers – and what they need for a decent subsistence? And what of the many in this small farmer group who have neither jobs on the side, nor pension rights, and must put up with the lowest standard of living in America? "If reform is to continue to outrun revolution in the United States," said Mr. Wallace on the same occasion, "we must make adequate job training available for young people displaced from our farms. These children must be retrained for useful work . . . [and] we must find a way to provide job opportunities for farmers who do not want to give up agriculture as a way of life."

Can part-time or *dependent* farming be what Henry Wallace calls a way of life? Or is it just a way of getting by? Is it a formula for a poor but happy existence, or a substitute for an adequate livelihood? If farmers are the salt of the earth, as Ezra Taft Benson used to say over and over again, ought not each one to be treasured? Russell Lord, whose *The Wallaces of Iowa* is a classic expression of the agrarian outlook, has undertaken to survey the history of agriculture from its beginnings in order to scratch up some wisdom, as he would say, which may be helpful in dealing with that question.

Lord's message is that the hazards of farming are a pattern of "the hazards of living by exchange." In the process of farming, man disrupts the natural order with plowshare and tooth harrow and insecticides to draw increasing life for himself and his kind. At the same time good farmers make the earth more fit to bear the life to come, despite what they take out of it today; they conserve both the soil and the social setting in which land can be so cared for. Such farmers, working in such a human environment, can crop soils continuously. That is the essentially conservative outlook which rises to the surface, sooner or later, in the gentlest as well as the wildest of agrarians. There has never been a peasant revolution since the beginning of time, or a farmers' movement in the history of this country, that led to any fundamental change in the social or economic order, even when nine out of ten of the people lived by agriculture. What the world of the farmer has generally displayed in the historic past is dissatisfaction with the world of the cities, the big merchants or the big bureaucracies. Woe to those who interfere with the farmer's care of the earth, for he cultivates it not only to supply us today, but so that the generation to come may be fed too.

This is a proposition that can be subjected to rational examination. Have Mr. Lord and the other agrarians confused conservation with conservatism? It will not do to keep saying with the Chatauqua lecturers of the time before the First World War, that "soil, ever slipping away in streams to the sea, is a kind of *wasting* placenta" that cradles man, and it must be cared for like mother love. The Chinese may have had to lace themselves into a straitjacket of static usages and institutions in order to preserve the fertility of their soils for three thousand years. Do we? Mr. Lord, a Yankee Confucius, suggests the abolition of plows, and a return to older methods of tillage with modern implements; he advises the "stubble-mulch method" of cultivation in which disc harrows are used to work the trash that is left after harvest into the soil, lightly, as ancient farmers used to stir the earth with ards and digging sticks. This is not his notion alone. It was once endorsed with enthusiasm by Rexford Tugwell, when he was Under Secretary of Agriculture; and Hugh Bennett, the most notable of the Chiefs of the Department of Agriculture's Soil Conservation Services, hailed it as "a revolutionary practice."

But that was more than 20 years ago, when Americans had not yet recovered from the effects of the great dust storms of the middle thirties. The lands that were blown out from under the Okies should never have been put to the plow in the first place; they are grasslands, better fitted for grazing than cultivation. And it was not the "worship of the Golden Calf" (as Vogt puts it) by city slickers that perpetrated this folly, but rural speculation in wheat when the price was first pegged in World War One. Since the late thirties, when wheat acreage was limited by law to the amount that would produce just enough for the needs of

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the nation at current yields, to this day when the same acreage yields more than twice as much, the increasing application of chemical fertilizers and other growth stimulants, not to speak of insecticides and synthetic weed-killers, has caused a mounting crisis of overproduction. It would take a great load off the back of Secretary Orville L. Freeman if ten percent of the arable land in the United States could be temporarily washed out to sea.

But that is a problem the agrarians can't handle. Indeed, they tend to conserve it along with everything else. "The agrarian New Deals administered by the Democrats in the interwar and postwar years of the 1930's and 1940's," says Mr. Lord, "clearly appear, under scrutiny, to be but a bolder extension of proposals already shaped by the Republicans in the Hoover era. And the Eisenhower Administration pronouncements and programs relating to the farm problem remained essentially unchanged." There is no mention of the present Administration in the book, but that makes little difference. So long as the House and Senate Agriculture Committees are dominated by agrarian politicians, they will continue to conserve the farm problem no matter who is President.

Underneath this apparent permanence, however, a glacial drift may be discerned. The present price-support laws are nominally *conservation* laws; that is what the preamble to this matted mass of amendments upon amendments says. The big trouble in the thirties when the basic legislation was written was indeed soil conservation. Most farmers were manhandling the earth in those days; millions of them were trying to coax a living out of soils as impoverished as themselves. Today the land reeks with fatness. What happened? Were they taught how to do this; did they learn? It would be wonderful if one could think so – if one could think that enlightenment alone might be a sufficient cause. No, the reason why commercial farmers take care of their soils today is because they cannot afford to do otherwise; a businesslike operator must look to the maintenance of his production base. The penalty for neglect is bankruptcy. But among poorer farmers the penalty is hunger, and throughout history they have been able to stand a lot of it.

Mr. Wallace along with Mr. Lord still insists that we must find a way to provide job opportunities on the side for farmers who do not want to give up agriculture as a way of life, but can't earn a full-time living at it. But we should find an adequate job for anybody who needs one. And we should be ashamed of ourselves that there continue to be so many rural part-timers and moonlighters, whether they farm between jobs or at night, who must work twice in order to earn a decent living. Agriculture is not so ennobling as all that.

Two Poets and their Muses

by David Ray

The reader who opens Kay Boyle's volume will find a poem beginning:

> Now the time of year has come for the leaves to be burning.

And a few lines later, we have "the sumac turning," and we know that it's time to write a poem. Surely poems should leap into existence for more pressing reasons. But here we find only a projection of the poet as sentimental woods-walker, the poet as professor of friendships, as dedicator of deeply felt midnight greetings. Above all, we have the poet talking about the capitalized experiences:

> . . . believing that all your sadnesses
> are moments of illusion;
> That the solitary has no distance,
> that all measures change.

Or, if the reader wants to find out about Death, he can find that "Death is a hand under the chin lifting the eyes to set again at the core."

My own preference is for poets who address beings smaller than History or America, and yet I do not doubt Miss Boyle's authority or importance (and I envy her certainty) when she addresses Carson McCullers:

> As statues take their height, their pure, unswerving gaze, their classic line from the chaotic clay.
> In days like these, when peoples in migration stage the allegory of racial flight,
> We have become articulate. When generations play the individual's tragedy
> And triumph out, then we are marvelously and faithfully portrayed. Shall we
> Despair that men we love move from the wings and take their part in history?

Such rhetoric moves at a level far above my head. Ironically, Miss Boyle has dedicated her book to William Carlos Williams – a poet who has moved most of his followers to admire metaphor rather than statement, the American idiom rather than an attempt at elevated rhetoric. Yet occasionally Miss Boyle achieves a lyric intensity, as in "The Evening Grass," a poem about suicide. It is also true that her rhetoric justifies its claim to wisdom and finality in poems like "The Artist Speaks." My central objection is that her poems are largely impersonal, predictable poems about suitably poetic subjects.

Collected Poems
by Kay Boyle
(Knopf; $4)
Collected Poems, 1937-1962
by Winfield Townley Scott
(Macmillan; $7.50)

Winfield Townley Scott is also a poet who encourages the notion that the poet's job is to walk through woods and think. Seriously. Willfully. Nor will I quarrel with this notion; it simply seems to me that Scott has, like Miss Boyle, written a few too many poems about the crocus spring, a few too many about grand and literary themes (Hamlet, Leif Ericson, Yeats). Yet Scott has a voice that, when he uses it, makes one rejoice. A few of his poems are masterpieces: "Landscape as Metal and Flowers," "Three American Women and a German Bayonet," "The US Sailor with

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the Japanese Skull" and "Mr. Whittier." In such poems, he demonstrates that he has a world, one to which someone, perhaps Robinson, awakened him – a world of the local war monuments, of Grant Wood and Winslow Homer, of Methodist encampments, and memories of the Townleys – a world that is personal, intense. Even where he is not fully successful, a song or an insight breaks through:

And looked on flesh and loved and lain
Deliriously in flesh again.

Such a couplet leaps out of an otherwise undistinguished poem. Randall Jarrell, comparing the poet to a man standing in a thunderstorm, waiting to be struck by the lightning of a poem's eruption within himself, once estimated that five or six lightning bolts would make a poet. We know that Scott has been struck by that lightning, and it is impossible to forget the voice of "Landscape as Metals and Flowers." This work recalls the true objects of his art – the rails at one's feet – *and the caboose* – things needing neither fustian nor dictionaries to locate:

All over America railroads ride through roses.

I should explain this is thoroughly a matter of fact.
Wherever sandy earth is piled to make a road for train tracks
The banks on either side are covered with wild, sweet
Pink rambler roses: not because roses are pretty
But because ramblers grow in cheap soil and will hold
The banks firm against rain – therefore the railroad roses.

All over America the steel-supporting flowers,
Sometimes at village depots covering the shingled station,
Sometimes embracing watertanks, but mostly endless tendrils
Out of which locomotives and pullmans flash the morning –
And tunnels the other way into whose firm, sweet evening
The whistle fades, dragging freight cars, day coaches and the caboose.

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JULES FEIFFER

THE ISSUE OF MOB VIOLENCE AND ITS RELATION TO OUR EDUCATION SYSTEM HAS RAISED A NUMBER OF INTERESTING QUESTIONS.

WE ALL AGREE THAT THE ROLE OF THE EDUCATOR IS NOT ONLY TO TEACH HIS SUBJECT BUT TO IMPART AN UNDERSTANDING OF MORAL VALUES.



BUT ONE CAN NOT PUSH A STUDENT BEYOND THE POINT HE IS WILLING TO GO. ONE MUST WORK WITHIN THE **SPIRIT** OF HIS **CULTURE**. THE SPIRIT OF **OUR** CULTURE IS **LATENT VIOLENCE**.

THOUGH ACHIEVING TEMPORARY RELEASE THROUGH TELEVISION PROGRAMS AND NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, THIS SPIRIT MUST OCCASIONALLY FIND A **DIRECT** OUTLET. MURDER WON'T DO. IT LOSES ONE THE RESPECT OF HIS NEIGHBORS.



HOWEVER, MOB VIOLENCE WILL DO **PERFECTLY**. HOW CAN ONE LOSE THE RESPECT OF HIS NEIGHBORS IF THEY **TOO** ARE BURNING AUTOMOBILES?

OUR PROBLEM THEN IS THAT, WHILE IT MAY BE ALL TO THE GOOD TO LECTURE AGAINST THE SPIRIT OF LATENT VIOLENCE, IS IT DESIRABLE TO LECTURE THAT SPIRIT INTO **EXTINCTION**?

CAN ONE BLANKETLY CONDEMN A SPIRIT WHICH IN ITS MORE ORGANIZED FORM IS DEPENDED ON TO DEFEND THE FREE WORLD?

SO OUR BASIC QUESTION REMAINS: IF WE ROB MEN OF THEIR DESIRE TO TAKE THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI, DO WE ALSO ROB THEM OF THEIR DESIRE TO TAKE CUBA?



IT IS NOT EASY TO TEACH IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.

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10-21

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MOVIES

Decisions, D-Day, Dassin

Five months before he died in 1891, Herman Melville finished *Billy Budd*, the greatest scenario for a novel that I know. The man who had orchestrated *Moby Dick*, if he had survived (in more senses than one), could have made *Billy Budd* another marvelously thick yet lucid symphonic work, instead of leaving it a beautiful, poignant sketch. Twelve years ago

Billy Budd (Allied Artists)
The Longest Day (20th Century-Fox)
Phaedra (Lopert)

Louis O. Coxe and Robert Chapman dramatized the book, fleshing it out perceptively and sympathetically where necessary. Now Peter Ustinov has written a screenplay derived from the book and the play, has directed the film, and appears as Captain Vere. In almost every way the film is a failure, and it is Ustinov's fault.

First, the script is ill proportioned; it seems one more story of naval mutiny that suddenly develops moral ambitions. But the script might have been made to serve if the direction had been skillful. The picture is paced too slowly, is overemphatic in holding reactions (and the editing often returns us unnecessarily to Face 1 after Face 2 has reacted to something Face 1 said), there is a plethora of shots looking up through the rigging; and many of the scenes, especially the trial scenes, are stagy, cramped, and show no film sense. Yet something of the original might even have won past the incompetent direction.

The *coup de grace* is Ustinov's performance as Vere, for *Billy Budd* is fundamentally Vere's tragedy. ("When you are on the mainyard, think of me, and pray for those who must make choices.") Instead of the strong, humane, disciplined old sea dog – the Vere that Geoffrey Keen, for example, might have played – we get a falteringly serious version of Ustinov's familiar comic bumbling act. How he could look in a mirror and cast himself as Vere is baffling. How a man with his ear could imagine that he was sounding like Vere is utterly incomprehensible. At one point he walks his quarterdeck with spectacles and book. For the right actor, this incongruous touch would have been effective in a man-of-war's captain. In Ustinov it seems so congruous that it confirms his wrongness for the part.

Presumably Terence Stamp was cast for Billy on the (correct) ground that freshness of spirit was more important than a handsome face. But Stamp simply does not generate sufficient angelic power, an aura of the unwitting moral genius. Robert Ryan, despite his American accent amidst a British cast, might have been an effective Claggart with a director who made him compress and concentrate on the point, instead of leisurely selling more of his by-now standard menace.

The worst thing about the whole venture is that it spoils the possibility of a good movie of *Billy Budd* for years to come.

In several ways *The Longest Day* is an extraordinarily good piece of filmmaking, which is not to say that it is an extraordinarily good film. Darryl Zanuck, as even Outer Mongolians must know by now, produced this immense picture based on Cornelius Ryan's bilateral account of D-Day, from a script written by Ryan with the assistance of, among others, James Jones and Romain Gary. It lacks the feeling of a complete view of the event, but its complex job of exposition is clear, fast, and exciting, and many of its battle scenes are excellent.

Verisimilitude is helped by having people speak their own languages, with subtitles for the French and German, instead of wallowing in accents. Different directors were used for the different national sequences. Next to the battles, the best scenes are the ones of the German command, directed by Bernhard Wicki, which have an atmosphere of factual recreation. The worst are some heart-to-heart scenes of the Americans, directed by Zanuck. The hard documentary texture is laced with syrup in scenes like the one between Henry Fonda and Edmond O'Brien or between Richard Beymer and his pals or by the very presence of Red Buttons. It was also a mistake to cast John Wayne as the paratroop colonel. When Wayne calls "Move out" to his men, he wipes out Normandy in a flash and takes us back to a dozen of his wars against the Apaches. The story's sentimentalities are doubtless factual, but the devotion to them hurts the large Armageddon swell. Nevertheless, despite the soft spots, I have never seen a three-hour film that seemed so short.

Because I was moved by *He Who Must Die* and was entertained by *Never on Sunday*, both of which were directed by Jules Dassin, I wish I could avoid mentioning his new film *Phaedra*. But my liking for the first two makes discussion of the third obligatory.



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The ancient legend has been transposed to the present. The husband is made an Onassis; his son, by his English first wife, is an artist in London. (Anthony Perkins, the son of this Greek father and English mother, speaks pure American.) The legend has also been altered so that the son, far from repulsing his step-mother, has a violent affair with her, ending in double death and beginning with a love scene, shot through fire and water, that would not exist if *Hiroshima mon amour* did not exist. The whole is tricked out in such sententious dialogue, such arty camera work, such heavy devices as choric black-dressed women, that before the first half-hour is up, we can only wish that the film would disappear, be forgotten, and not be held against Jules Dassin. Perkins seems a peevish stripling next to Melina Mercouri, his inamorata; and she has been betrayed by her adoring director into a performance that should make Joan Crawford look to her withered laurels. Miss Mercouri's strength is vulgar vitality, not Dior clothes-horsing around. She needs to get back to being a Greek actress in true Greek pictures. This is Greece-for-export in a glamorized package. Raf Vallone, the husband, strikes the only valid note, perhaps because Dassin was least interested in him.

If this film is the result of Dassin's success, one must wish it the failure it deserves so that he may be shaken back into the values of his earlier work.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

ART

The Halpert Collection

About a year and a half ago it was reported here that the Corcoran Gallery of Art in Washington was at sixes and sevens over the bonanza offer of the private collection of Edith Gregor Halpert, for 35 years the proprietor of the Downtown Gallery in New York and as such perhaps the leading dealer in American art throughout that period. Mrs. Halpert took over most of the artists from "291" and An American Place after Stieglitz retired; in addition she made discoveries of her own; the essential Downtown group – although some have since gone elsewhere and although the Downtown itself has long been uptown – includes Arthur Dove, John Marin, Georgia O'Keeffe, Ben Shahn, Mitchell Siporin, Jack Levine, Yasuo Kuniyoshi, Max Weber, Charles Sheeler and Stuart Davis. The collection itself, naturally, includes work by many other artists. Happily, the uncertainty then reported has been resolved; all parties are in agreement on the gift; the project awaits only the blessing of Mortimer Caplan, your friendly tax collector, to insure that after all these years Washington, D. C., will have a decent representation of 20th Century American art on public view. Present expectations are that by sometime in 1964 the Corcoran will have refurbished a suite of separate galleries and in them the Halpert collection will be permanently installed. In the interval, arrangements are in progress to lend many of the pictures to the State Department so that foreign visitors there can know of an American art as well as of their own art which now normally greets them in sometimes brilliant but chancy exhibitions in the lobby.

Right now, the Corcoran itself is showing 166 paintings and sculpture from the Halpert collection. The show is instructive. It reminds us again that the relations between art and government in this country, unlike all other countries, are strictly left to chance. The National Gallery, a monument, as it should be, to the European past, owes its presence here to the chance ambition of Andrew Mellon and, ultimately, to the mercantile brilliance of Lord Duveen. The National Collection of Fine Arts owes its presence to the Smithsonian's apparent inability to turn down a gift, any gift, on the theory that it may be of value; the National Collection, in fact, has turned out to have a great deal of value, including large numbers of paintings by Childe Hassam, John Twachtman and Albert Ryder; but there again, chance ruled: beautiful paintings by these major Americans are hung in the shadow of the dominant Abbott Thayer. And the Halpert Collection itself has arrived in the capital through the lifting of no single finger on the part of the American government. As a government, we just don't give a damn, an attitude that has held since about 1940 and gives little promise of change.

Despite governmental indifference, then, a superb collection of American 20th-Century art has arrived in the American capital and looks as if it is there to stay. The collection is immensely valuable in the light it throws upon a body of American art still not fully appreciated. The individual achievement of the artists in the Downtown group was and continues to be enormous. Yet it is possible to survey American painting of this century and assign those artists a minor place. This can be done by adhering strictly to the imperatives of fashion. The century opened with the dominance of a kind of watered down Barbizon style. This was at once challenged by the raucous triumph of the Ash Can School, which triumph, ironically, led directly to the Armory Show in 1913 and the consequent rejection, by large numbers of younger artists, of the Ash Canners themselves and all their works. The Armory Show led to two decades of home-grown European-type, modern-type painting, which in turn, during

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the thirties, yielded to a blend of social realism and American scene painting. From this, in the mid-forties, came abstract expressionism which even now is the closest thing to a dominant fashion.

Now, starting with Arthur Dove and John Marin, Downtown artists were working throughout this succession of fashion and they never quite made it in the sense of total adulation. Nobody ever made a cult of Marin, or Sheeler, or Davis, or Shahn. The most promising note in the American retrospective now at the Corcoran is that the artists never were the fashion.

The promise is borne out. We see pretty quickly why fashion as an end was irrelevant to the artists themselves. From first to last they were interested in two kinds of things outside themselves: the world they saw or otherwise became aware of, and the objects they themselves could bring into existence through their habits of artistry. Every one of the major Downtown artists has an instantly recognizable personal style, but in every example of that style the style itself is suppressed in favor of the thing seen and made.

For example: the show has a Shahn drawing of Vanzetti; you think first of all, probably, of the subject himself; your remembrance and sympathy are elicited; there is an appeal to your desire for social justice. At the same time you appreciate the way the figure is placed within the space of the picture and the angular grace of the head. You think, perhaps, how appropriate this linear vision is for this particular figure. At no time do you lose yourself – certainly at no time are you asked to lose yourself – in pure admiration of Shahn's line, despite your recognition that the line is wholly admirable.

Again, at the opposite extreme from Shahn's constant awareness of social reality, take the pictures by O'Keeffe and Sheeler. The same thing happens. Sheeler's "Wind, Sea and Sail" is a penetrating spatial and linear insight into the nature of swelling waves, billowing sails and the perceptible "planes" in the air experienced in small boat sailing. O'Keeffe's "In the Patio" reduces the scene to a single shadowed corner of two walls meeting, light overhead. In both pictures we are given a a total fusion of visual or kinetic experience with the strictly aesthetic experience of the painting itself. It is only with an effort that we begin to take account of the exquisite skill and the extraordinary awareness that had to go into the making of both pictures.

This self-effacement, this authentic artistic humility, holds even in the one painter in the group who, more than any other, habitually deals with a subject not noted for self-effacement on the part of its practicing artists. This is Stuart Davis; the subject is jazz. But it is jazz abstracted and restated visually; his American jazz is related to without representing our neon and traffic lights; finally it is shaped and controlled within a basically austere pattern which is the artist's own. "Hot Still Scape for Six Colors" is a big band performance in the six colors used – more red, white and blue than anything else – and in the repetitions and variations of such basic visual shapes as arrows, balls, dots, x's, zig-zags, confetti and leaves from the trees. It's a gay, happy, vibrant painting. Yet it is contained within and built around a strong rectangular grid transversed by a powerful diagonal swelling at the center, pointed at the ends. This is the classical imposition of order on chaos in order better to reveal the nature of chaos. The last thing in the world we are asked to consider is the painter's personal sympathetic response to jazz.

It can be conjectured that all responses of fashion – including those to a neo-classic fashion – are romantic in impulse and hence, in art, more often associate themselves with romantic art. The virtue of the Halpert Collection – both as a monumental increment to the public domain and as a significant addition to the American capital – is its revelation of a genuine, austere and moving classical spirit in the American art of our time.

FRANK GETLEIN

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RECORDS

From Bach to Mildred Bailey

In 1932 the great Lieder-singer Elena Gerhardt recorded an album of performances of Hugo Wolf songs, with fine piano accompaniments by Coenraad Bos, which HMV in England issued in a limited edition as Volume One of the so-called Hugo Wolf Society, and which became one of the rarest and most treasurable of collectors' items. Those who heard her enchanting singing in the twenties, and younger music-lovers who may be interested in hearing what it was like, will be glad to know that the 1932 performances have been reissued on Rococo 5202, which adds to them a performance of *Auf dem gruenen Balkon* that was not in the album, and three that Gerhardt recorded in 1907, with sloppy piano accompaniments by the conductor Nikisch. Of the beautiful voice that she uses with sensitive feeling for the flow and shape of the musical phrase in 1907, only a shadow remains in 1932; but it is an agreeable and at times lovely shadow, and a medium with which the matured Gerhardt art can produce its distinctive subtleties and marvels of expressive phrasing. An accident in the transfer to LP causes the song *Nun wandre, Maria* to come off without the passage *Wohl seh' ich, Herrin . . . ach, kaum verwinden.*

Of the singers who bring beautiful voices and sensitive feeling for the musical phrase to the singing of Lieder today, the most impressive is the baritone Fischer-Dieskau. His exploration of the less familiar examples of the literature gives us, on Deutsche Grammophon 18-793 (mono) and 138-793 (stereo), a number of songs of Liszt, one of the composers whose music I find unappealing. And on 18-715 and 138-715 it gives us a number of Schubert settings of texts on subjects of Greek antiquity, of which the effective ones, for me – in addition to the familiar *An die Leier* – are *Lied eines Schiffers an die Dioskuren, Aus Heliopolis* and *Freiwilliges Versinken.* Fischer-Dieskau has with him again, on these records, the pianist Joerg Demus, who contributed so much to the great performance of Schumann's *Dichterliebe* on Decca DL-9930.

And on Deutsche Grammophon 18-716 and 138-716 the soprano Rita Streich offers lovely-sounding and well-phrased performances of Schumann's *Der Nussbaum, Schneegloeckchen, Die Lotosblume* and *Auftraege* and Strauss' *Wiegenlied,* and a number of other songs by these composers and Brahms, with good accompaniments by Guenther Weissenborn.

Though I don't review jazz, I feel impelled to devote a few lines to the performances of the singer Mildred Bailey reissued on Columbia C3L-22. Every one of them – whether she is singing a good song or a poor one, and whether she is accompanied by the inventive playing of a small group of jazz instrumentalists or only by a large band's playing of an arrangement – is made a delight by the exquisite inflection of her lovely small voice in phrasing whose subtle displacement of accents around the beats is controlled by a feeling for the shape of the phrase – as against the extravagant freedom with rhythm and notes (for example, in Billie Holiday's singing) that makes what is sung no longer recognizable as the phrase of the song. And the records give us a comfortable number of the fine performances with small groups that have Teddy Wilson, Mary Lou Williams, Billy Kyle or Ellis Larkin at the piano, including several recorded late in 1935 – among them *Some Day, Sweetheart* and *Willow Tree* – that are made outstanding by the fresh and richly inventive playing Teddy Wilson was doing at that time. But the space on the records that should have given us the delightful *I'd Like to Take Orders From You* recorded on the same day as *Some Day, Sweetheart* and a half-dozen other such performances with small groups, is used instead for the foolish purpose of giving representation to the Dorsey Brothers and Benny Goodman Orchestras, and is wasted on their uninteresting performances with Bailey merely singing a chorus.

The Holtkamp organ of the General Theological Seminary in New York, on which Carl Weinrich plays the Bach pieces on RCA Victor LM- and LSC-2557, doesn't have the clearly defined sound in its lower register that the Holtkamp organs at Yale and MIT have. Much of the superb Prelude of the Prelude and Fugue in E flat from the *Clavieruebung* is blurred, as are some passages in the Toccata and Fugue in D minor, the *Dorian* Toccata and Fugue in D minor, and the Toccata in E. And I continue to find Weinrich's playing unattractively stiff and at times ineffectively paced.

Horst-Tanu Margraf's tempos for some of the slow movements in Handel's Concerti Grossi Op. 6 Nos. 10, 11 and 12 also are ineffective, and the Handel Festival Orchestra of Halle ploughs through the fast movements insensitively. The sound from Epic LC-3843 and BC-1243 is a little harsh and is improved by a 9-kc cut-off.

The solo part of Mozart's lovely Clarinet Concerto is played by Robert Marcellus with beautiful tone and phrasing, and is provided with a fine orchestral context by the Cleveland Orchestra under Szell, on Epic LC-3841 and BC-1241. The reverse sides have Strauss' Horn Concerto Op. 11, with Myron Bloom as soloist.

The Juilliard String Quartet is a highly competent group, whose one weakness is the grainy tone of its first violin; and this I find disturbing in the otherwise excellent performance of Beethoven's Quartet Op. 131 on RCA Victor LM- and LSC-2626.

Klemperer begins the engaging first movement of Mahler's Symphony No. 4 much too slowly, but brings it up to an acceptable tempo later on; and his pacing of the subsequent movements is effective – though I prefer the more animated Scherzo of Solti's performance on London CM-9286 and CS-6217. Klemperer obtains from the Phil-

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

David Ray *is a member of the English faculty of Cornell University.* William E. Boggs *is a New York editor who usually writes about science.*

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harmonia Orchestra beautiful-sounding and clear realizations of Mahler's textures, and from Elisabeth Schwarzkopf what, for her, is relatively unmannered singing in the last movement. The sound from Angel 35829 is superb; S-35829 I didn't hear (and I will add that there would be no need of hearing both mono and stereo versions if they always exhibited only the differences between mono and stereo sound. The need arises out of the fact that occasionally one version may exhibit a defect – distortion of piano sound, or unpleasant harshness of orchestral sound – that is not exhibited by the other.)

Debussy's 12 Etudes for piano, which he wrote near the end of his life, and which exercise the hands in the playing of thirds, fourths, sixths and so on, also exercise Debussy in the use of the varieties of his fully developed style of writing for the piano; and some of the results – the Etudes concerned with thirds, octaves, eight fingers, chromatic steps – are as interesting pieces of music as the better-known ones with imaginative titles. Charles Rosen's performances of them on Epic LC-3842 and BC-1242 are first-rate. B. H. HAGGIN

BALLET

The Rival Traditions

The current exchange of visits by the Bolshoi and the New York City Ballets has given audiences and critics in both countries a chance to compare two very different companies, whose styles are a result of years of artistic inbreeding. The Bolshoi, with its elaborate sets, romantic music and flawlessly trained dancers, excels in the classic "white" ballets like *Swan Lake*, *Giselle* and *Chopiniana* (*Les Sylphides*), choreographed by masters like Petipa, Ivanov and Fokine. No company outside the USSR can match the dazzling leaps and lifts of the Bolshoi soloists, or the precision of its *corps de ballet*. But *Spartacus*, the Bolshoi's ambitious attempt to create a modern ballet, was merely a spectacle, or as the critics maintained, a spectacular flop. In contrast, the New York City Ballet, with an almost bare stage, the dissonant, staccato music of Igor Stravinsky, and dancers schooled in the angular choregraphic style of George Balanchine, has created ballets like *Orpheus* and *Agon*, which have become classics in our time. But Balanchine's staging of traditional masterpieces like *Swan Lake* and *Nutcracker* is clumsy and uninspired.

American audiences applauded the Bolshoi lustily, but the reviewers, particularly those of the New York press and national magazines, showed themselves to be something less than connoisseurs. On opening night a performance of *Swan Lake* earned the prima ballerina, Maya Plisetskaya, and the cast, a total of 22 curtain calls; but it was casually dismissed the next morning by Allen Hughes the dance critic of *The New York Times*. Mr. Hughes and his colleagues, Winthrop Sargeant of *The New Yorker* and an anonymous gentleman at *Time*, faintly praised a few performances including *Giselle* and some of the divertissements in the *Highlights* programs, but they heaped most of their scorn on *Spartacus*. They spent so much emotion in denouncing the "tastelessness" of the production that they neglected to point out that it was imported at the urging of the American impressario Sol Hurok. After this disappointing reception, the remaining performances of *Spartacus* were canceled, and many members of the cast returned to Moscow.

The reviewers' treatment of the Bolshoi will certainly do nothing to improve the prospects for broadening the cultural exchange agreement with the USSR, which the State Department renegotiated with considerable difficulty several months ago. If the Bolshoi were an American company, its members would be aware that most US ballet reviewers know very little about their subject. "Incompetent" is the word used by Lincoln Kirstein, the outspoken General Director of the New York City Ballet, to describe the ballet critics of

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The New Yorker and *Time;* he added that they, and the other critics of the working press, were read "more for curiosity or corroboration than for advice." But because visitors have no way of knowing this, there is a serious danger that irresponsible criticism of fine performances will leave the Bolshoi with an unfortunate impression of American hospitality.

I discussed the tour and the reviews with Ekaterina Maximova, the young Bolshoi ballerina who earned unanimous praise for her performance in the divertissements, and particularly for her *Giselle*, in which she demonstrated that she is a superb actress as well as a brilliant dancer. At 22, Miss Maximova is now making her second visit to this country with the Bolshoi. Shy and soft-spoken, she was too courteous to comment on the reviews of the company's New York performances, saying only that although the reviews were translated for the dancers, they were not widely read, and that she had not read many herself. She conceded that the reaction of foreign audiences during the Bolshoi's tours had some effect on Soviet ballet. For example, some of the longer ballets are being shortened, and much of the pantomime eliminated.

When it returns to Moscow, the company will present a new version of Tchaikovsky's *Sleeping Beauty*, choreographed by the Bolshoi's ballet master, Asaf Messerer. Although Moscow audiences prefer romantic works like *Swan Lake, Giselle* and *Don Quixote*, the Bolshoi is experimenting with modern ballets, which it has not yet performed in the West. These include Yakovsky's *Song of the Woods*, choreographed by Lapauri and Tarasova, and Bela Bartok's *Night City*, by the company's chief choreographer, Mikhail Lavrovsky. When I asked if this work indicated any new trends in Soviet ballet, Miss Maximova commented that it was developing "in many different directions."

This was a touchy question, because the Bolshoi's failure to create successful modern ballets has provoked strong criticism in the Soviet press. The managements of the Bolshoi and the Leningrad Kirov ballets have been blamed for their unimaginative, old-fashioned artistic leadership, and many disgruntled young dancers have left each company. Neither company seems to have the boldness to create truly modern ballets.

The New York City Ballet is faced with the same problem in reverse. After almost two decades under Balanchine's artistic dictatorship, the company seems to have lost touch with the grace and elegance of the classics. Instead of encouraging both traditional and modern ballet, Balanchine has made the company a showcase for his own works; for example, of the 18 ballets the company is presenting in the Soviet Union, 16 are his own.

So far, according to a note from one of the New York City dancers in Moscow, Soviet audiences seem to find Balanchine's abstract ballets bewildering. And many Moscow critics seem no more sophisticated about this style than our critics were of the Bolshoi's more traditional idiom. A writer for the Soviet magazine *Nedyelya*, stated that "Some critics were shocked by the frivolity and slightness, to speak frankly, of this far-from-academic ballet."

This suggests that the time might be right to include choreographers in the cultural exchange program. The Soviets have invited Balanchine to return to stage a work with the Bolshoi. In turn, why not invite Asaf Messerer, Leonid Lavrovsky or one of the Kirov choreographers to stage some of the

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classics by Petipa or Ivanov with an American company? The give and take involved in staging a new ballet might stimulate some creative insights on both sides. At the very least, such an exchange would introduce some refreshing choreography to dancers and audiences, both Soviet and American. It might even help to educate the critics.

WILLIAM E. BOGGS

Correspondence

What Next?

Sirs:

The world heaves a sigh of relief. Khrushchev's unbelievable rashness in placing Soviet IRBM's in Cuba has been succeeded, after the predictable American reaction, by equally unbelievable flexibility and good sense. For the moment our firmness (really much more: our obvious intention to go to war) has paid off. The Russians have backed down.

Our present policy, unless it is sheer desperation or total recklessness, can be based only on the existence or presumption of sufficient strategic superiority to afford us effective counterforce. In my opinion it is wholly unlikely that we can maintain this posture indefinitely or even for the next five years. While the Soviets cannot run a production race with us, they need not do so to insure our destruction. This they can achieve relatively cheaply and easily with a very few superbombs, launched from very hard or very hidden sites, by bombs in orbit, by non-ballistic trajectory missiles, and so on.

If we now fail to reach an understanding, not just in Cuba, but in Europe as well, it is a forgone conclusion that the Soviets will step up the arms race in this direction to avoid the need of backing down again, and that the advocates of the hard line will triumph here *and* in the Soviet Union. Very fortunately Khrushchev managed to put survival before pride this time. It is not at all clear whether *we* would have been able to do so, and it is doubtful whether the Russians will be able to do it again. It is vitally important therefore that we do not attempt to push firmness too far, that we resist the temptation, because it has worked this time, of relying on the hard line at all times. To avoid the incredibly grave prospects of a continued impasse, *both* sides will have to show flexibility in the forthcoming negotiations, both sides will have to yield something of substance. For instance the Russians on Allied troops in Berlin, the West on recognition of East Germany, or vice versa. Now is the time, perhaps the only one, to make a start toward achieving a real settlement. The East-West confrontation has been shaken out of its rigor mortis, American public opinion has received its severest jolt ever, and Khrushchev's withdrawal from Cuba has made real negotiations possible. The world has tasted death and is ready, one hopes, for a return to sanity. Let us not miss this opportunity, born of great danger, and perhaps the last we will be afforded.

Robert Gomer
Chicago, Illinois

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

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